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Abstract
The work is divided in two parts. We start by studying a finite decision
model where the utility function is an additive combination of a personal
valuation component and a social interaction component. Individuals are
characterized according to these two components (their valuation type and
externality type), and also according to their crowding type (how they influ-
ence others). The social interaction component has two main properties, it
is formed by dyadic interactions and based on whether individuals make the
same or diﬀerent decisions. We characterize pure and mixed Nash equilibria,
namely through the study of type symmetries imposed by the social profile
on the personal valuation space. In the second part we study duopolies where
firms engage in a Bertrand competition and consumers choose strategically
taking into account the consumption choice of other consumers. We propose
an index that measures the social propensity of a market and allows a clas-
sification of markets according to the social interdependence of its consumer
choices. Through the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium, with first stage
local pure price equilibrium for firms, we characterize local market equilibria
and show that with social propensity duopolies have non-monopolistic out-
comes. Furthermore, we characterize prices, demand and revealed personal
preferences.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The image chosen to feature on the cover page of this thesis is a work by
portuguese painter Amadeo Souza Cardoso, called Os Galgos. In the 1911
painting, the sugestion of action about to unroll relates to two main ideas
behind the present work. Interaction can be seen through the eyes of the
symmetry eﬀect it induces between the characteristics of actors and actions.
As context changes, interaction induces a dynamic interdependence on the
change of actions. The first part of this work develops the first idea and
studies the dependence of actions on the symmetries that the social charac-
teristics of individuals and their interactions impose on the space of personal
profiles. This is done through the equilibrium notion on a decision game.
The second part of the work builds on the second idea, finding local pure
price solutions for a duopoly derived from the implicit changes that inter-
actions provoke, and proposing a classification of markets according to an
index of social interdependence of its consumer choices.
1
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The decision game
A decision is in general a course of action resulting from a process which
involves selecting among several possible alternatives. The collective co-
existence and constant interaction of individuals necessarily creates a social
frame in which decisions are made and a social context to which the decision
leads. Regardless of whether these interactions are voluntary or not, they
play a significant role in the global patterns of behavior that emerge from the
individual decisions. Understanding what underlies a global behavior means
understanding not only the interactions among decision-makers, the personal
evaluations of alternatives and the interdependence between the two, but also
having a grasp on the relation between the characteristics of the decision-
makers and the characteristics of the global outcome. In fact, each decision
composing this outcome, conveys information about the decision maker, as
it reveals a choice, be it either a selection of a product to buy or a public
service; be it an economic strategy, a political option or a social behavior;
be it a life changing choice or a daily life decision, like choosing a bar to go
to friday night. Thus, the study of the global behaviour both presupposes
and enhances an understanding of what governs individual decisions. This
is particularly relevant if it is assumed that individuals act rationally and
the choice is a best response over the evaluation of the alternatives, in the
sense of the existence of a Von Neumann-Morgerstern utility (1944).1 At
the core of a game theoretical approach to the problem is the modelling
of interactions between decision-makers. Assuming decisions as a global
mutual best response, one may use the concept of Nash equilibrium (1951)
to retrieve information not only on a global interacting level, but also on
an internal individual level, by analysing the interdependence of these social
1The issue of rationality is beyond the scope of this work, nevertheless, as we will be
looking at the outcome and not at the decision process itself, and as we will be working in a
complete information setting where the parameters are open to interpretation, underlying
is in fact a very mild rationality assumption.
3characteristics and the individual personal evaluation processes. The focus
of the first chapter is the relation between the characteristics of individuals
and the characteristics of the outcome, where the outcome is seen as the set
of Nash equilibria of a finite non-cooperative game.
Positioning the approach
The study of the dependence of global behaviour (as an equilibrium) on the
characteristics of individuals, and in particular the study of the dependence
of individual decision rules on the strategies of others, has a long tradition.
Namely, in the work of Schelling (1971, 1973, 1978) where, for example, dif-
ferent distributions of the level of tolerances of individuals lead to residential
segregations with diﬀerent properties; or in the work of Granovetter (1978),
where small diﬀerences on the distribution of individual thresholds can lead
to completely diﬀerent collective behaviour; or in Mas-Collel (1984), Pascoa
(1993) where an atomless distribution of types leads to symmetric equilibria;
or other symmetry properties as in Wooders, Cartwright and Selten (2006)
and Wooders and Cartwright (2014), which, as in this work, describe parti-
tions of the set of players into groups that arise in equilibrium.
Our approach is to model the outcome of a decision process as the Nash
equilibria of a finite (both in players and strategies) non-cooperative, si-
multaneous move game. The value of a given decision is measured through
an utility function that is an additive combination of two components: (i)
how much the individual personally values the decision, independently of the
strategies of others; (ii) the externalities arising from social interactions with
those individuals who make that same decision. This is, of course, a very
broad class of utility functions included in many models in the literature.
The crucial aspect is the choice of how to model the form of dependence
on the strategies of others, i.e. how to model social interactions. Let us
highlight three main features of our approach to this choice, and position
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our work in relation to the diﬀerent approaches in the literature.
A first key feature we consider is dyadic interactions (see for example [8],
[20]). Dyadic means that, for any given strategy, the influence/impact of an
individual i on an individual j is independent of the decisions of others. A
class of games that focuses only on this kind of interactions is for example
the class of polymatrix games, see [23], [35].2 Another option would be to
introduce (also or instead) a dependence of this influence on the whole strat-
egy profile. In general, excluding such a component usually means excluding
some form of non-linear anonymous aggregate dependence on the strategies
of others. In fact, many games can be captured by an appropriate dyadic
component by using such an excluding assumption, as for example by mak-
ing the appropriate restriction on singleton weighted congestion games, or
on the games presented in [8], [10], [36]. The dyadic component is sometimes
refered to as the local component of social interactions and the latter depen-
dence as the global component.3 Focusing on dyadic interactions seems like
a suitable approach for the case we wish to study.
A second feature is assuming the influence from interactions to be presence-
based. Presence, means social interactions have a dichotomic nature, in the
sense of being restricted to whether individuals are using the same strat-
egy or a diﬀerent one, a type of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
assumption [37]. In this work it can be better described and motivated in
the following manner: given a strategy profile, if an individual i changes her
decision, the change only aﬀects those in her new decision, because she will
start interacting with them, and those in her old decision, because she will
no longer interact with them. Her influence on the rest of the individuals
was that she was making a diﬀerent decision, and that hasn’t changed. This
is also in the spirit of Independence of Irrelevant Choices as in [27], or no
2A first formal reference appears to be due to E. B. Yanovskaya in 1968.
3The use of the terms local and global in this context seem amenable to critique, since
one could think of ‘global dyadic components’ or ‘local aggregative components’, hence
we prefer the terms dyadic and aggregative.
5spillovers as in [28]. This assumption is important for some of our results in
the first chapter, which would not hold without it.
The third feature is that we will allow for social interactions to give rise
to both positive and negative externalities, and then study their eﬀects on
equilibria and society formation. The question here could be whether to
restrict the dependence to be in some sense ‘positive’ or complementary,
leading to a conformity eﬀect; or ‘negative’ leading to a congestion eﬀect.
On the strand of literature that treats conformity eﬀects (those leading to
a common (or symmetric) action which may overcome personal or intrinsic
preferences) are for instance the works on behavioral conformity by Wooders,
Cartwright and Selten [52], a theory of conformity by Bernheim [7], a model
of herd behavior by Banarjee [5], the threshold models of collective action
as in Granovetter [21], or even the equilibrium symmetry in supermodular
games as in Cooper and John [15]. On the strand of literature focusing
on congestion eﬀects is for example the class of congestion games as first
proposed by Rosenthal [38], later generalized by Milchtaich [30]; or the works
of Quint and Shubik [36], Konishi, Le Breton and Weber [27], to name a few.
Social interactions, regardless of whether they exhibit a conformity or
congestion eﬀect, should depend not only on the number of individuals in
each choice, but also on the characteristics of those individuals. This is a cru-
cial aspect in the works of Wooders ([49, 50, 51]) and of Conley and Wooders
([12, 13, 14]). Wooders’s earlier papers allow preferences to depend on the
characteristics of agents (their types), while Conley and Wooders separate
two sorts of characteristics: crowding characteristics, which determine the
eﬀects of a player on others, and tastes. In our model we will use a type
profile that characterizes individuals, or distinguishes, according to three dif-
ferent aspects, or attributes. (Keep in mind though that for us type does
not mean Bayesian type, as we will be working on a complete information
setting and the type profile is something completely determined a priori.)
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Following the work of Conley and Wooders, we will start with the use of a
crowding space, which distinguishes individuals by their impact on the util-
ity of others. The use of a crowding space has the advantage that allows the
characterization of classes of strategies where the relevant information is the
number of individuals with the same crowding type in each decision. Observe
that there is no restriction here: depending on the choice of the crowding
space individuals may be all distinguishable or totally anonymous. We then
characterize individuals according to their utility function, i.e. taste type,
but we will subdivide the taste type into two components, using the two
additive components of the utility function. This allows the characterization
of Nash equilibria according to the restrictions imposed on the relation be-
tween these two components. Furthermore, dividing the taste type in this
way, separates the social part of the model, that captures the social interac-
tions, from the ‘personal’ part given by the valuation component (sometimes
called intrinsic preference, which we wittingly avoid). A key advantage of
the separate analysis of the valuation component is that, besides comprising
the intrinsic and personal perceived benefit of the decision, it captures exo-
geneous changes and/or characteristics associated to each decision. Namely,
dependending on the decision in question, it may represent prices, taxes,
product quality, road quality, marketing, political campaings, bribes, etc...
In particular, for the second part of this thesis, the valuation component
reveals how individual choices depend on prices.
The work on the first chapter starts as an extension of the two types di-
chotomic model by Soeiro et al. [43] to a wider finite setting where there may
be any number of types of individuals facing a choice among any number of
possible alternatives, and is primarily based on Soeiro et al. [42]. The former
work finds its inspiration from Brida et al. [9], a socio-economic model that
analyses how the choice of a service is influenced by the profile of users of that
same service; and, on a diﬀerent line, from Almeida et al. [2], where game
7theory and the field of social psychology are related through the theories of
Planned Behavior or Reasoned Action, proposing the Bayesian-Nash equi-
librium as one of the many possible mechanisms behind the transformation
of human intentions into behaviors.
The duopoly game
A main driver of the study of price competition in oligopoly theory has been
the determination of factors that, within a simple analytical framework, can
sustain a pure price equilibrium with firms earning positive profits. In the
context of a Bertrand competition, with price as the only strategic variable
and uniform pricing (the same for all consumers), the search for asymmetric
equilibria assumes particular relevance. In general, the departure from the
paradoxical zero profit equilibrium involves either breaking the symmetry
on the firms side or on the consumers side, by introducing some degree of
heterogeneity. These are the general Hotelling vs Edgeworth approaches. An
asymmetry on the firms side of the market is usually introduced through the
Edgeworthian approach, by allowing diﬀerent cost structures or capacity con-
straints, which often leads to indeterminateness of prices and non-existence
of pure price equilibrium. This is dealt with some appropriate continuity
assumptions and produces mixed strategy price solutions, which are in gen-
eral hard to compute and often face critiques as to their interpretation. On
the consumers side of the market (what we abusively called the Hotelling
approach), the asymmetry usually relies on some heterogeneity, either from
the usual vertical or product diﬀerentiation, or from other sources like search
or switching costs, incomplete information or diﬀerent price sensitivities. In
some cases pure price solutions are known to exist, although also depending
on appropriate assumptions which essencially rely on heterogeneity and some
further continuity assumption (see for example [11] and references therein).
Other general approaches to the problem would involve leaving the stan-
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dard Bertrand framework and considering other strategic variables for firms,
for example by allowing firms to also compete by choosing quantities as in
Cournot, choosing/investing in quality, or others. Note that solutions based
on the temporal dimension can in fact be seen as introducing timing as a
strategic variable. 4
From a game theoretic perspective though, there is an inherent strategic
asymmetry in the original Bertrand framework: the set of players is com-
posed of firms and consumers, and while firms play strategically and their
best response depends on the whole strategy profile (prices and consumer
choices), consumers best response depends only on prices, hence ignoring
part of the game’s strategic profile. Notwithstanding that in many markets
this assumption may still be appropriate (like the classical mineral water
example), in most markets today, consumption behavior shows increasing
social propensity. In particular with the growth of internet, the emergence
of social networks and the increase of data availability, the asymmetry of
information between firms and consumers has reduced, and the very role
that consumers play on each others’ choices is today of greater importance.
Moreover, the idea of consumption externalities, its relevance and economic
implications are now better understood and extensively studied (see for ex-
ample [25], [19] or [24]).
The decision game of the first chapter provides a road to close the strate-
gic asymmetry gap and create duopolistic market solutions in pure price
strategies. In a first stage firms simultaneously choose prices and in a sec-
ond stage consumers play a decision game based on those prices. A market
equilibrium will be a subgame perfect equilibrium of this two stage game.
4For general reviews we refer to the classical book references on industrial organization,
for example [46, 48] or microeconomic analysis, e.g. [47].
9Socially prone duopolies
A decisive main characteristic of a market is how demand changes, in partic-
ular how it reacts to price. The introduction of strategic interaction among
consumers changes the price elasticity of demand and in general disrupts the
zero profit paradox. Whether it is a more intricated form of social influence,
status seeking or a simpler consumption externality, consumers might prefer
or get stuck in a more expensive service, or at least have a smoother reaction
to price undercutting strategies. The eﬀect of a price deviation is mitigated
or amplified by the eﬀect consumers exert upon eachother, and the demand
behavior no longer responds solely to the price diﬀerence. We propose a
social propensity index to characterize markets and outcomes according to
how changes are captured by the social component of a market. The in-
terpretation is that it reveals how consumers may change their strategy in
response to local changes in the overall consumer profile, which is reflected
in the demand response to prices. We say that a duopoly is socially prone if
it has a non-null social propensity index.
In the finite case, the drawback in having consumers act strategically is
the coordination problem posed by the multiplicity of equilibria, that now
extends beyond the region where firms charge the same price. Furthermore,
for pure price solutions to exist with both firms earning positive profits, it is
necessary to ensure a continuous demand response to price deviations in the
neighbourhood of an equilibrium. Our approach to solve both these prob-
lems is to assume that, locally, consumers using pure strategies will continue
to use pure strategies, and consumers using mixed strategies will continue
to use mixed strategies. This will implicitly define a unique local continuous
response to small price deviations, which works as a natural coordination
device for firms. Naturally, there are discontinuous alternatives, which are
credible since they are a Nash equilibrium of the consumers subgame, nev-
ertheless they seem less plausible from an economic perspective. It’s hard
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to envision a situation where firms believe that small price changes create
a disruptive consumer behavior, especially when there is a credible smooth
alternative. We prove the existence of local market equilibrium for these
continuous deviations, with shared demand and positive profits. We charac-
terize prices and show that equilibria reveal consumers personal preferences.
The conditions are rather general and rely exclusively on the properties of
the social profile of consumers through the social propensity index. Socially
prone duopolies thus disrupt the Bertrand paradox and provide pure price
solutions. These solutions do not rely on heterogeneity to exist nor to be
asymmetrical.
Social propensity index and local influence network
In the duopoly case under consideration, the social profile is based on a so-
cial externality function whose properties will be inherited by demand, and
reveal how consumers interact and the interdependence of their choices. The
choice and characteristics of the social externality function are thus decisive
to determine the type of duopoly and consequent results. Two main lines
can be identified as crucial in this choice: the degree of social heterogeneity
and its functional form. Nevertheless, to understand demand changes, the
crucial aspect is not the externality function itself, but rather how changes in
some consumer strategy aﬀect the rest of consumers. As an example, think
of a social network like facebook. There may be a large network of conec-
tions between users, which naturally provoke externalities, but the decision
itself depends on how users look and interpret this conections, how they are
influenced by them, which need not be by the whole of their conections. In
our context this superstructure within the actual consumer network struc-
ture is what we call the local influence network. The nodes in the network
are consumers and the edges represent the influence two consumers have
on eachother, which is dependent on the context created by the consumers
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choice. The network is thus directed, weighted and state-dependent. Hence,
consumers may have diferent influence on eachother, and that influence need
not be symmetric nor have the same value throughout the network. Further-
more, it is state-dependent in the sense that the weight will depend on the
consumers choice. A natural way to represent the network is through its
weighted adjacency matrix. In order to use the standard notation and to
provide a more intuitive representation, an weighted directed edge from i
to j should represent the influence i has on j, which should be the value of
the entry ij. The adjacency matrix of the influence network is defined as
the transpose of the Jacobian matrix of social diﬀerentiation.5 For a given
consumers choice, social diﬀerentiation is the diﬀerence between the exter-
nalities consumers incur in each service, at that ‘moment’. The influence
network reveals changes in social diﬀerentiation provoked by a change in
consumers strategy. This in turn provokes changes in the consumers utility
diﬀerential. Note, however, that for consumers using pure strategies, this
may not result in a strategy change if the Nash equilibrium condition is not
strict. We call consumers using pure strategies, loyal consumers. When a
change needs to be suﬃciently high to result in a change of their best re-
sponse, we say that loyal consumers have lower sensitivity. This means that
for interior points the crucial aspect to capture local changes in demand is
the non-loyal consumers influence network. The idea that loyal consumers
may have lower sensibility and not always contribute to social propensity is
rather natural, and intuitive to the very notion of brand loyalty. We observe
though, that loyalty diﬀers from installed base, since being loyal is a strate-
gical behavior (those who opt for pure strategies) and not an exogeneously
imposed choice, or a choice deriving from some switch cost or other stabi-
lizing variable. Each network has a social propensity index which proposes
to give information on how consumers react to changes and classify markets
5We hope this comment avoids more confusion than it creates. This is just a clarifica-
tion, as it will only be used in the graphical representation.
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accordingly. For markets with social propensity, pure price equilibrium exist
and prices will be dependent on social propensity. A negative index will
slow down demand response to price undercutting strategies, as for some
consumers the incentive of turning to a cheaper service is overcome by the
externality, similarly to a congestion, snob or Veblen eﬀect. A positive index
amplifies the demand response similarly to a conformity, herd or bandwagon
eﬀect, allowing firms to take advantage of the contextual presence of some
consumers and in general leads to monopolistic settings or type-symmetric
consumer response to prices. Interestingly, when consumer interactions are
dyadic the externality becomes additively separable and social propensity
locally constant. In this case equilibrium demand varies linearly with price,
proportionally to social propensity, and the consumers profile determines the
equilibria. So preferences are revealing, besides revealed.
Related literature
The literature on price competition is vast. We will refrain from a gen-
eral review and focus on the main distinguishing features of our approach
in relation to the literature. Rubinsteind and Osborne ([34], page 6) define
the oligopoly problem as centered around the potential indeterminateness of
price equilibria with a few number of competitors. We build up the duopoly
on a finite set of consumers and are able to stabilize prices in pure strategies
by allowing consumers to use mixed strategies, which, with a consumption
externality, exist on a conected price region. The majority of the litera-
ture approaches the existence problem departing from a continuous set of
consumers. This doesn’t mean the approaches have many qualititively dif-
ferent results. Naturally, mixed strategies are linear combinations of pure
strategies, and this poses a limitation to the kind of social externality we are
considering. Nevertheless, our approach seems to hold for any C1 externality
function defined over a continuous space of strategies. An advantage of the
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approach is that pure price solutions based on consumer mixed strategies
provide in general simpler analitical solutions and more natural interpreta-
tions than mixed strategies for firms. Consumption has in many contexts
a smaller temporal frame than pricing strategies, and may be seen as a re-
peated choice on the temporal frame of pricing. Furthermore, one need not
consider loyal consumers as installed bases of non-strategic consumers, but
as consumers using pure strategies, hence being strategic consumers.
In our approach we allow for a general externality function, which can
be either aggregated or based on a network, and we impose no specific fuc-
tional form (nor require). We assume uniform pricing (the same price for all
consumers), negative prices are not allowed and consumption is mandatory
(in the duopoly consumers do not have a third option of not buying). We
characterize local pure price solutions and study the eﬀects of the hetero-
geneity of consumers and the eﬀects of symmetries of the consumer profile.
However, we do not need nor require heterogeneity or homogeneity of con-
sumers. These are the main features that allow to position our work and its
contribution.
An interesting survey including consumer demand under network eﬀects
and social influence can be found in [45]. On the literature and importance of
network economics [24], [19], [25]. The existence of a pure price equilibrium
for example in [11] or [16]. On price competition subject to aggregated con-
sumption externalities, which do not depend on specific consumers but on
an aggregated demand variable, we highlight the conection with the work of
Grilo et al.(2001) [22] that “combine the consumption externality model and
the spatial models of product diﬀerentiation”. Nevertheless, the results are es-
sentially derived under a specific functional form, firms have installed bases,
the consumers set is continuous and heterogeneity based on spatial models.
Hackner, Nyberg (1996) [26] study welfare aspects of negative reciprocal ex-
ternalities, of which congestion is a special case. Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
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(2007) [1] analyze price competition and eﬃciency of oligopoly equilibria
where the allocation of network flows is subject to congestion costs cap-
tured by a route-specific nondecreasing convex latency function. We do not
focus on negative or positive externalities, but allow both forms. On (posi-
tive) network externalities there is strand of literature building on Katz and
Shapiro (1985), but which assumes Cournot competition, rather than price
competition. On price competition with a consumer network Banarji and
Dutta (2009) study the dependence of market segmentation on the under-
lying network structure, consumers have however the option of not buying.
A recent ongoing work by Aoyagi (2013) [4] studies the dependence of the
equilibrium on the underlying network structure, but in this case negative
prices are allowed. An interesting work by Allen and Thisse (1992) in [3], al-
though assuming non-strategic consumers is worth mention due to the study
of pure price equilibria for an homogeneous product oligopoly market where
consumers have diﬀerent price sensitivities.
Our focus is on uniform pricing, however, there is an interesting growing
literature on price discrimination which does not connect directly to the
present work, but could be an interesting future possibility (see for example
Fainmesser and Galeotti (2015) [17] and references therein).
Organization of the work
The work unfolds as follows: in the next chapter, first section, we set up
the model and present a map characterizing the profile of individuals; in
section 2.1.1 we present a conformity obstruction lemma which allows us to
characterize the conditions in the individuals profile for a given strategy to be
admissible or feasible as a Nash equilibrium; in section 2.2.2 we present the
relation of our model to the concept of society introduced in [52]; in section
2.2.3 we define the Nash domain of a strategy (in terms of utility parameters)
and characterize it completely; in section 2.2.5 we discuss conditions on social
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profile for the existence problem to be independent of the personal profile;
and finally, in the end of the sections we prove the results.
In the third chapter we start by setting up the duopoly game in the first
section, and in section 3.2 we present our main result characterizing market
equilibria. In the following section 3.3 we study symmetry properties of
the influence weights and the dependence of the underlying network, and in
section 3.4 we study the case where consumer interaction is dyadic.
In the final chapter we present conclusions and directions for future work.
In the appendix we present a game and interface programmed for Netlogo.
Software
The free software R was used for computations, simulations and for the
network figures in the second chapter, where routines where created for future
applications. Netlogo was used for testing with the class of decision games up
to 4 types and 4 possible actions, programming the game in appendix. The
rest of the figures regarding tilings, Nash domains, monopolies and demand
have been made using Adobe Illustrator (except for figure 2.5 which was
computed using Matlab). The option of using Illustrator had the aim of
better conveying ideas, hence improving images which attempt to ilustrate
an idea rather than providing rigourous mathematical statements.
Notation
Throughout the work we will use in general: boldface for variables that
convey information about the whole set of players, called generally profiles;
caligraphic letters for spaces of such profiles and greek letters for specific
parameters of a game. The symbol ⌘ is used for definitions.
16 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
The decision game
The main idea behind the results in this chapter is that the diﬀerence in
payoﬀs of similar individuals is bounded by the externality they provoke on
eachother. Using the type map this allows us to consider a social profile
and characterize the set of equilibria according to the symmetries imposed on
the space of personal preferences. We study how positive externalities lead
to strong type symmetries, while negative externalities allow the existence of
equilibria that are not type-symmetric and have a stronger dependence and
sensibility to the parameter space.
2.1 Game setup
The decision model we present is based on a finite non-cooperative game.
We consider a finite set of individuals I ⌘ {1, . . . , nI}, each having to choose
independently an element from a finite set of alternatives A ⌘ {1, . . . , nA}
(the common strategy set).1 We describe the decisions of the individuals by
a strategy map s : I ! A associating to each individual i 2 I her decision
si ⌘ s(i) 2 A and defining a (pure) strategy profile s = (s1, . . . , snI ) 2 S ⌘
AnI . The strategy profile s has a value for each individual i 2 I determined
1Later on we show that it is possible to consider that individuals have diﬀerent set of
actions Ai and the results will hold.
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by an utility function u : I ⇥ S ! R and denoted u(i; s). The game consists
in each individual independently making a choice that maximizes her value.
Personal and social separability (PSS). The utility function has the
personal and social separability property if there are maps ! : I ⇥ A ! R
and e : I ⇥ S ! R such that
u(i; s) = !(i, si) + e(i; s).
With the PSS property the utility becomes an additive combination of:
(i) a personal map !(i, a) which determines how much an individual i 2 I
personally values each alternative a 2 A, independently of the strategies
of the others; and (ii) a social externality map e(i; s) which determines de-
termines the social impact of the strategy profile s on individual i, that is,
the externalities arising from social interactions. In a first look it may look
counterintuitive that the strategy of individual i is still part of both com-
ponents. This is, however, the key point of driving the model into a game
theoretical framework. If the strategy of individual i was not included in
the social component, her best response would not depend on the strategy
of other individuals, which would remove the interaction part of the model.
The idea for the PSS property comes from the theories of planned behav-
ior and reasoned action (see for example [2]), and a main advantage of the
PSS property is allowing a separate analysis on the personal component and
the social component of the decision. The variable also allows to explicitly
acomodate variable transformations, for example, if each individual has its
own action set Ai, we can consider a common strategy set A = SAi and a
personal map such that !(i, a) =  1 whenever a /2 Ai. This leads to the
same set of Nash equilibria since a will never be chosen by i. The separate
study on the properties of the social externality map, means we are able to
focus on the properties of the impact of others on individual’s i decision.
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A first natural property one may consider for the social component is
dyadic interactions. Dyadic means that, for any given strategy, the influ-
ence/impact of an individual i on an individual j is independent of the deci-
sion of others, that is, social externalities are a result of pairwise interactions.
Networks are a natural example of such interactions.
Dyadic interactions (DI). The social externality map is based on Dyadic
Interactions if for every individual i 2 I it is additively separable in the
strategy of the other individuals, i.e. for every strategy profile s it is given by
e(i; s) =
X
j 6=i
e(i, j; si, sj).
A second natural property to consider is that social interactions are based
on presence, in the sense of being restricted to whether individuals are using
the same strategy or a diﬀerent one. This restriction on social interactions
is in line with some common assumptions in the game theoretic literature,
as that of Independence of Irrelevant Choices in [27], or no spillovers in
[28]. These are in general assumptions in the spirit of what’s most com-
monly known as a type of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives assump-
tion (which has long been used, but sometimes diﬀers depending on the
context, see for example [37]). In our case, the assumption is in fact one
of dichotomic social influence, as we stated in the introduction. That is,
individuals are influenced by other individuals who make the same decision,
and also by those who make a diﬀerent decision, but just by the fact that
they made a diﬀerent decision, independently of what decision that is. With
that in mind we call this a presence-based influence.
Presence-based influence (PBI). The social externality map has the
presence-based influence property if e(i, j; si, sj) = e(i, j; si, s0j) whenever
sj 6= si 6= s0j.
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A variable transformation as is done in [43] shows that with DI and PBI
we can consider a map ↵ : I ⇥ I ⇥ A ! R describing pairwise interactions
determined by social weight coordinates ↵ija , which may be interpreted as
how much individual i is influenced by an individual j when they are both
making decision a. (Note that in general this need not be a symmetrical
map.) The component only depending on individual i is called personal
value coordinate and denoted by !ia 2 R, and may be interpreted as how
much an individual personally likes or dislikes to make a certain decision.2
Let us denote the set of individuals who choose a 2 A in a strategy profile s
by s 1(a) ⇢ I. An utility function with properties PSS, DI and PBI can be
written as
u(i; s) = !isi +
X
j2s 1(si)\{i}
↵ijsi .
Let U be the space of such utility functions. For a given utility function
u 2 U , we call the decision model with the above properties a decision game
  ⌘  (I,A, u). We will sometimes refer to decision games where there are
only positive externalities as social conformity games; and to games where
there are only negative externalities as social congestion games.
2.1.1 The profile of individuals
We will study diﬀerent invariances that arise in a decision game where the
utility function has the PSS, DI and PBI properties, and then characterize
games from diﬀerent invariance classes. These classes are related to how
individuals may be distinguished in the game, be it either because they
have diﬀerent utility functions or because they have diﬀerent impact on the
utility function of others; or both. The interpretation is that an individual
2The idea is that we may assume e(i, j; si, sj) = 0 whenever sj 6= si and obtain an
isomorphic set of equilibria. Furthermore, we are in fact assuming that ↵iia = !ia. There is
a slight abuse in using the same letter for the personal value coordinate and the personal
map, but it makes things more clear, as they in fact represent the same thing, although
with the variable transformation there might be a displacement.
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is characterized in three main lines: how the individual sees the decisions,
how she sees others and how others see her.
Crowding types
We start by analyzing the invariance derived from those characteristics of
individuals that influence the utility of others. Following the work of Conley
and Wooders ([12, 13, 14]), these are called the crowding type of the indi-
viduals. Let C be the set of possible crowding types and let c ⌘ c( ) =
(c1, . . . , cnI ) 2 C ⌘ CnI denote the crowding profile of individuals in a de-
cision game  . Two individuals j1, j2 2 I have the same crowding type
cj1 = cj2 = c 2 C if for all i 2 I and a 2 A we have ↵ij1a = ↵ij2a ⌘ ↵ica .
We will use the standard notation (si; s i) to represent strategy profile s,
but highlighting the component of individual i and the remaining strategy
profile s i. The utility function for an individual i 2 I can be rewritten
using the crowding space,
ui(si; s i, c i) ⌘ u(i; s) = !isi +
X
j2s 1(si)\{i}
↵
icj
si .
The use of a crowding space in the characterization of a game has the advan-
tage that the utility of an individual i associated with a strategy profile s is
invariant under permutations of strategies of other individuals with the same
crowding type. Thus, the crowding space C induces a natural equivalence
relation in the strategy space S.
Externalities and valuations
The second step in our approach is to distinguish individuals according to
the two additive components of the utility function, namely separating the
part that measures the externality eﬀects from the part that measures the
individual’s personal valuation of the alternatives A. We will categorize indi-
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viduals according to these two components so that we can then characterize
a Nash equilibrium according to the restrictions it imposes on the relation
between these two components. The two components are: (i) the column
vector of personal personal values ~!i ⌘ !i(A) 2 RnA ; and (ii) the matrix
of social weights given to each crowding type, the social externality matrix
ei ⌘ ei(A, C) 2 RnA⇥nC ;
~!i ⌘
0BBB@
!i1
...
!inA
1CCCA , ei ⌘
0BBB@
↵i11 . . . ↵
inC
1
... . . .
...
↵i1nA . . . ↵
inC
nA
1CCCA.
We observe that the impact of the personal value vectors ~!i in this relation
will not be given by the precise value of their coordinates, but rather by the
relative preferences they induce, namely the diﬀerence between each pair of
coordinates. That is, if a given decision d is a best response for an individual
i, then if we changed her vector of personal values by the same amount in each
coordinate, d would still be a best response. We will take this into account
using a valuation space V with the following property: if two individuals
i, j 2 I have the same valuation type vi = vj ⌘ v 2 V , then their vectors of
personal values are in the same relative valuation space. More precisely, the
relative valuation space spanned by ~!i is
W (~!i) ⌘ {~!i + k~1 : k 2 R}.
Hence, if the two individuals have the same valuation type v, then W (~!i) =
W (~!j). However, we do not ask the equivalence class to be maximal, i.e.
there might be individuals with diferent valuation types vi 6= vj such that the
corresponding vectores of personal values ~!i and ~!j satisfy W (~!i) =W (~!j).
With a slight abuse of notation we will refer to the personal values vector
of individuals with the same valuation type v as ~!v. The profile of personal
value vectors of all individuals is denoted by ! ⌘ !(I;A) ⌘ (~!1, . . . , ~!nI ) 2
(RnA)nI . The valuation profile is denoted by v ⌘ v(I) ⌘ (v1, . . . , vnI ) 2
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V ⌘ V nI . Note that a profile of personal values might or not be compatible
with a valuation profile. The set of all social externality matrices associated
with the crowding profile c of a given game is described by the externality
profile e ⌘ e(I;A, C) ⌘ (e1, . . . , enI ) 2 E ⌘ EnI ⌘ (RnA⇥nC )nI . We will
use ↵eicja to refer to coordinates ↵
icj
a of an individual with externality type
ei.
Type map
The categorization of individuals can now be done according to their personal
and social profile through a type map t ⌘ t  : I ! T which indicates the type
of an individual in the type space T = C⇥E⇥V . The subscript on the type
map (which we will omit) is there to reinforce that when we say type we do
not mean bayesian type, rather the type map reveals symmetries of the utility
profile, hence of a particular decision game  , and thus it is something known
a priori. The type map defines a type profile for the game given by the triplet
t = (c, e,v) in the space T = (C ⇥ E ⇥ V )nI , composed of: (i) a crowding
profile c characterizing individuals according to their crowding type; (ii) an
externality profile e characterizing individuals according to their externality
type; and (iii) a valuation profile v characterizing individuals according to
their valuation type. Note that the pair (ei, vi) is what is usually called
an individual’s taste type. An advantage of separating the taste into two
components is that now the pairs (ci, ei) are responsible for the ‘social’ part
of the model; they capture the social interactions in the model. We refer to
this pair as the social type of an individual. The valuation type component
vi, that represents the way an individual values the possible choices, may be
analysed separately.
The type profile of a decision game conveys information, or imposes re-
strictions, on the characteristics of its Nash equilibria. On the subsequent
sections we will study the information one can retrieve about the structure of
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the utility profile of a decision game from studying the restrictions imposed
by the type profile on the set of Nash equilibria.
A decision game has two main characteristics: (i) the type space, hence
the number of types; and (ii) the number of decisions. We refer to diﬀerent
decision games by these two distinguishing features and denote the corre-
sponding class of games by  nT ,nA . Changing one dimension or the other
has diferent impacts and produces diﬀerent chalenges. Note for example
that it is not possible to construct a game with only two actions without the
presence-based influence property (PBI).
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2.2 Pure Nash equilibria
A strategy profile s is a pure Nash equilibrium, if for every individual i 2 I,
u(i; si, s i)   u(i; a, s i), for every a 2 A.
2.2.1 Feasibility
A first natural problem is whether individuals of the same type may use
diﬀerent strategies in a Nash equilibrium, hence, whether all Nash equilibria
are type-symmetric. The first lemma is a result on the relation between a
social type and its valuations in a Nash equilibrium. Let us start by defining
for two individuals i and j the following measure of influence in a strategy
profile s, called their influence relation
Rij(s) ⌘ ↵ijsj + ↵jisi .
The influence relation reveals the bilateral externalities that two individuals
would incur were they to change their decision. That is, if two individuals
have a positive (resp. negative) influence relation in s, then at least one of
them would incur a positive (resp. negative) externality by changing (unilat-
erally) her strategy and joining the other in her decision. When Rij(s) > 0
we say that the individuals i and j have a tendency to conform, given by
a positive externality relation in s. Similarly, if Rij(s) < 0 we say that
individuals i and j have a negative externality relation in s.
Let dist(·, ·) be the distance given by the supnorm.
Lemma 1 (Conformity obstruction). Consider a decision game   and a
Nash equilibrium s. If i, j 2 I and si 6= sj then
dist(~!vi , ~!vj )   Rij(s)/2  nIdist(ei, ej).
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individuals need to be suﬃciently diﬀerent to make diﬀerent decisions at a
Nash equilibrium. Thus, their personal valuation of alternatives obstructs
their tendency to conform to the decision of one another. When negative
externalities are in place, this is not the case, since they do not have a ten-
dency to conform. The conformity obstruction lemma leads to the following
theorem for positive externalities.
Theorem 1 (Positive externality). Let i, j 2 I be two individuals of the
same social type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej), and s 2 S a Nash equilibrium such that
si 6= sj. If Rij(s) > 0, then
dist(W (~!i),W (~!j))   Rij(s)/2
The theorem reveals that, in a Nash equilibrium, individuals of the same
social type with a tendency to conform need to have diﬀerent valuations of
the alternatives in order to make diﬀerent decisions. We say that a strategy
profile s 2 S is admissible with respect to a type profile t = (c, e,v) if the
following property holds: if i, j 2 I are two individuals of the same social
type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej) with si 6= sj and Rij(s) > 0, then they have diﬀerent
valuation types vi 6= vj . Equivalently, if vi = vj and Rij > 0 then si = sj .
Corollary 1 (Nash equilibrium admissibility). A strategy s 2 S to be (c, e,v)
admissible is a necessary condition for s to be a Nash equilibrium.
Note that we have not imposed any condition so far on individuals of
diﬀerent social types, and we will make that clear. Given a type profile
t = (c, e,v), we say that a strategy profile s 2 S is t feasible, if s satisfies
the following two properties: (i) s is t admissible; and (ii) if i, j 2 I are two
individuals with diﬀerent social types (ci, ei) 6= (cj , ej), then vi 6= vj . (Note
that this does not mean i and j have diﬀerent personal values, but rather
that they are allowed to have diﬀerent ones.)
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Theorem 2 (Nash equilibrium feasibility). Given a strategy profile s 2 S
and a type profile t 2 T , if s is t feasible then there is a profile of personal
values ! 2 RnA⇥nI compatible with the valuation profile v 2 V, such that s
is a Nash equilibrium.
We note that given a type profile t and a strategy profile s, to be t
feasible is not a necessary condition for s to be a Nash equilibrium.
2.2.2 Social contexts and equilibrium partitions
The set of Nash equilibria of a decision game can be partitioned according
to the information conveyed by the type map, i.e. according to the individ-
uals profile. The set of characteristics of individuals can be distinguished
between those on a more internal level, the taste of individuals, and those on
a more external, or visible level, the crowding type. It is therefore natural to
start partitioning equilibria according to the crowding profile of individuals.
Given a strategy profile s and a crowding profile c, we define social context as
the pair (s, c). In studying social contexts that are based on a Nash equilib-
rium strategy s, the characterization of the structure of the utility profile is
naturally limited to studying subsets of individuals that are dintinguishable
in that social context, and therefore provide diﬀerent information. Using
the crowding space, the utility function can be fully characterized by the
following (reduced) utility matrix for each individual i 2 I,
Ui ⌘ U(i;A, C) ⌘
0BBB@
!i1 ↵
i1
1 . . . ↵
inC
1
...
... . . .
...
!inA ↵
i1
nA . . . ↵
inC
nA
1CCCA .
The utility matrix defines the taste (or utility) type of an individual, and
the utility profile U ⌘ U(I;A, C) ⌘ (U1, . . . , UnI ) 2 (RnA⇥(1+nC))nI deter-
mines a decision game. The set of Nash equilibria of a decision game will
naturally depend on the utility profile. Nevertheless, diﬀerent utility profiles
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may lead to the same Nash equilibria. Hence, we will study properties of
utility matrices of decision games for which a given strategy class is a Nash
equilibrium.
Consider a partition P(s, c) of the set of individuals I according to the
social context (s, c), meaning that every pair (d, c) creates a block P (d, c)
of the partition whose elements are all the individuals i 2 I with the same
crowding type ci = c and using the same strategy si = d. That is,
P (d, c) ⌘ {i 2 I : (si, ci) = (d, c) 2 A⇥ C},
P(s, c) ⌘ {P (d, c) : (d, c) 2 A⇥ C}.
This kind of partitions is particularly interesting to relate to the notion of
society defined in [52], and in fact inspired by it. A society is an element of
a subpartition of a block P (d, c) with an aditional property of convexity as
defined properly below. Let us first denote convex hull by con(·) and without
ambiguity let us use the same notation for the convex hull formed by the
utilities of some individuals J ⇢ I, thus
con(J) ⌘
⇢X
j2J
 jUj :  j 2 R+0 and
X
j2J
 j = 1
 
.
A set of individuals S 2 P (d, c) is called a society if it satisfies the following
convexity property: if for i 2 I, ci = c and Ui 2 con(S), then i 2 S (see
[52]). The society is maximal if there is no other society S0 2 P (d, c) such
that S ⇢ S0. Given a decision game and a block P (d, c) of a social context,
let us denote by SP (d, c) ⌘ {S1, . . . , Sk} a partition of P (d, c). Let now
SP(s, c) ⌘
[
i2I
SP (si, ci).
The partition SP(s, c) is called a societal partition if its blocks SP (d, c) are
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formed by societies, and it is called a minimal societal partition if it is formed
by maximal societies.
Definition 1 (Global minimum societal partition). A societal partition is a
global minimum if all its societies coincide with the P (d, c) block, i.e. for all
S 2 SP(s, c), S = P (d, c).
We observe that while a partition P(s, c) is based on a combinatorial
concept, societies are based on a topological one. A fundamental question
is understanding the minimal societal partition of a Nash equilibrium, and
in particular if that partition is a global minimum. We will show that, in
the context of our work, when there are only positive externality relations
between the P (d, c) blocks for a given strategy, the societal partition is a
global minimum. In particular, in a conformity game, the minimal societal
partition of a Nash equilibrium is always a global minimum, and thus there
are at most nAnC societies. That is not the case however for games with
negative externalities. We will show that social congestion games may not
have global minimum societal partitions of its Nash equilibria, and there
may be up to nI maximal societies. For a given block P (d, c), let
U(d, c) ⌘ {Ui : i 2 P (d, c)}.
We say that two sets of individuals I, J 2 I have a tendency to conform
in strategy profile s, if for all i 2 I and j 2 J , Rij(s) > 0. Note that
Rij(s) = ↵
icj
sj + ↵
jci
si .
Theorem 3 (Positive externalities). Let (s, c) be a social context and s a
Nash equilibrium. If for two distinct decisions d, d0 2 A and a crowding type
c 2 C, the blocks P (d, c) and P (d0, c) have a tendency to conform in s, then
con(U(d, c)) \ con(U(d0, c)) = ;.
30 CHAPTER 2. THE DECISION GAME
Theorem 3 relates directly to the notion of societies, and in particular to
the concept of global minimum societal partition.
Corollary 2 (Positive externalities). Let (s, c) be a social context and s a
Nash equilibrium. For every c 2 C let P (d, c) and P (d0, c) have a tendency
to conform in s, for every d, d0 2 A, with d 6= d0. There is a global minimum
societal partition.
In particular, for every Nash equilibrium of a social conformity game the
minimal societal partition of a Nash equilibrium is a global minimum.
2.2.3 Strategy classes and Nash domains
The crowding space allows the characterization of classes of strategies where
the relevant information is the number of individuals with the same crowding
type in each decision. We thus define the crowding-aggregate decision matrix
L(s, c) whose coordinates, lca = lca(s), indicate the number of individuals with
crowding type c 2 C who choose alternative a 2 A in strategy profile s,
L(s, c) ⌘
0BBB@
l11 . . . l
nC
1
... . . .
...
l1nA . . . l
nC
nA
1CCCA .
We denote by L ⌘ {L(s, c) 2 RnA⇥nC : s 2 S, c 2 C} the set of all possible
crowding-aggregate decision matrices in a given game. Given a matrix L 2
L, there is always a subset of strategy profiles S 2 S such that, for any
s1, s2 2 S, we have L(s1, c) = L(s2, c) = L. Thus, the set L characterizes
the crowding equivalence relation in the strategy space S induced by the
crowding profile c, and we will refer to the strategy class L 2 L to mean the
equivalence class {s 2 S : L(s, c) = L}.
The utility Nash Domain N (s, c) of a given social context (s, c) is defined
as the set of all utility profiles U for which s is a Nash equilibrium under the
crowding profile c. For an individual i 2 I the best response utility domain
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Ni(s, c) of a social context (s, c) is the set of all utility matrices Ui such that
si is a best response of individual i to s i under the crowding profile c.
Remark 1 (Nash domain cone structure). Let (s, c) be a social context. We
have,
(i) N (s, c) = N1(s, c)⇥ · · ·⇥NnI (s, c);
(ii) if U1, U2 2 Ni(s, c) then  U1 + µU2 2 Ni(s, c), for all  , µ > 0;
(iii) if si = sj and ci = cj then Ni(s, c) = Nj(s, c).
We note that by condition (ii) Remark 1 the best response utility domains
Ni(s, c) have a cone structure. Let s(I) (the image by the strategy map
s) be the subset of decisions chosen by individuals I ⇢ I in the associated
strategy profile s. Individuals with the same crowding type retrieve the same
information from the aggregated structure of a strategy class L, and if they
are using the same strategy, they in fact share a best response utility domain
(hence (iii)). Therefore, these domains can be described using the crowding-
aggregate matrix, i.e. Ni(s, c) = N(si, ci;L(s, c)), and we can rewrite the
utility Nash domain of a social context as follows
N (s, c) = ⇥d2s(I),c2CN(d, c;L(s, c))lcd .
Given a crowding profile c, a strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if, and
only if, for every non-empty block P (d, c) of the partition of the respective
social context (s, c), we have
U(d, c) ⇢ N(d, c;L).
We note that the domains N(d, c;L) do not preserve externalities in the
following sense: given two best response utility domains N(d, c;L) and
N(d0, c;L), there are some utilities in N(d, c;L) which would provoke a ‘posi-
tive externality relation with’ some utilities in N(d0, c;L), and there are some
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utilities in N(d, c;L) which would provoke a ‘negative externality relation’
with some utilities in N(d, c0;L). That is, the influence relation is not pre-
served. Since it will be useful to study sets that preserve these relations, we
will add an externality profile to the social context, extending it so that we
can fiber the best response and utility Nash domains by the externality pro-
file e. Let (s, c, e) be the social context extension to externality profile e. For
an individual i 2 I the best response valuation domain N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c))
of a social context extension (s, c, e) is the set of all vectors ~!i such that
si is a best response to s i, in the profile context c, e. We observe that if
~!i 2 N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)), then W (~!i) ⇢ N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)). Furthermore,
the sets N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)) are convex, non-empty and preserve externali-
ties. The Nash valuation domain of a social context extension (s, c, e) is thus
given by the cartesian product
N (s, c, e) = ⇥i2IN(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)).
Theorem 4 (Positive externalities). Let i, j 2 I be two individuals of the
same social type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej) and s 2 S a Nash equilibrium with si 6= sj.
If i and j have a tendency to conform in s, then
N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)) \N(sj , cj , ej ;L(s, c)) = ;.
Let It be set of individuals with type t 2 T , and recall that individuals
of the same type have the same valuation of alternatives. For a given type
t = (c, e, v) 2 T , the type best response valuation domain is
N(t;L(s, c)) ⌘
\
i2It
N(si, c, e;L(s, c)).
In a strategy profile s, individuals of type t 2 T are using best responses if
~!v 2 N(t;L(s, c)). If type t has a tendency to conform, Theorem 4 poses a
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problem for strategies for which s(It) is not a singleton. Recall that being
admissible required diﬀerent valuations for individuals of the same social type
with a tendency to conform but making a diﬀerent decision. It is now more
clear that being admissible with respect to the type profile, is a necessary
condition for a strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium (Corollary 1).
Theorem 5 (Nash domain characterization). If s is t admissible then for
every t 2 T , N(t;L(s, c)) is a (non-empty) convex set that is the closure of
an open set and
N (s, c, e) = ⇥t2TN(t;L(s, c)) 6= ;.
Furthermore, if s is t feasible then every ! 2 N (s, c, e) 6= ; is compatible
with v.
Theorem 2 follows from the above theorem. Let Ic be the set of individ-
uals with a given crowding type c 2 C. Theorem 5 provides an interesting
conection to the number of societies in a minimal societal partition of a Nash
equilibrium. Take for instance for all the individuals i 2 I, ↵icd =  1, for
every d 2 A and c 2 C. Hence, all individuals have the same social type
given by the externality matrix with all entries  1. Since for any given
c 2 C, N(t;L(s, c)) contains an open set, it is possible to choose an utility
profile so that we can order the utilities of all the individuals along a line
in N(t;L(s, c)) with the order that we prefer. Each order of the individuals
along the line creates a number of societies that only needs to be compatible
with the combinatorics imposed by the number of individuals of Ic that are
in each block P (d, c). Thus, taking
Mc = min{2(nc   p¯c) + 1, nc},
where nc = #Ic and p¯c is the cardinality of the largest set P (d, c) ⇢ Ic, we
obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 3 (Negative externalities). Given a social context (s, c), for every
c 2 C choose qc such that #s(Ic)  qc  Mc. There are utility profiles
U 2 N (s, c) such that the minimal societal partition has cardinalityPc2C qc.
As such, for any given social context (s, c), the following minimal societal
partitions can arise:
- (global minimum) there are utility profiles U 2 N (s, c) such that the
minimal societal partition is the global minimum societal partition;
- (no global minimum) if for some c 2 C there are decisions d, d0 2 A,
with d 6= d0, #P (d, c)   1 and #P (d0, c) > 1, then there are utility
profiles U 2 N (s, c) such that there is not a global minimum societal
partition;
- (maximality) if
P
c2C qc = nI , then there are utility profiles U 2
N (s, c) such that the cardinality of the minimal societal partition is
nI , and thus it is maximal.
2.2.4 Conformity thresholds and decision tiling
For the explicit characterization of the Nash valuation domains of a social
context extension, let us start by the analysis of the individual’s best re-
sponses. We will then define thresholds for the valuation domains of those
best responses in terms of the personal values. For this analysis it will be
useful to rewrite the utility function using the strategy classes L. Recall
that in this section when we say Nash equilibrium we always mean pure
Nash equilibrium. As it is natural when dealing with pure Nash equilibria,
we will have to make comparisons between pairs of decisions, and this can
be done comparing lines in the utility matrices, since each line d of those
matrices is associated with the utility of the individual i when using strategy
si = d. Hence, it will be useful to introduce a notation for the line vectors
associated with each decision. When the choice of an individual i 2 I is
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d 2 A, the social influence that she is subject to, in a given strategy profile
s 2 S, may be summarized by two vectors: the social preferences vector
~↵i(d) 2 RnC , comprised of the social weights given by individual i to the
aggregates of each crowding type in decision d; and the crowding-aggregate
vector ~l(d) 2 RnC whose coordinates correspond to the line d of matrix L,
and thus indicate the number of individuals with crowding c 2 C who make
decision d in a given strategy class L,
~↵i(d) ⌘ (↵i1d , . . . ,↵inCd ), ~l(d) ⌘ (l1d, . . . , lnCd ).
The utility function can now be rewritten for strategy classes through the
above vectors. For an individual i 2 I it is given by
ui(si, ci;L) ⌘ ui(si; s i, c i) = !isi + ~↵i(si) ·~l(si)  ↵icisi
where · denotes the usual inner product. Note that determining the utility
of an individual using a strategy class L instead of a specific strategy profile
s, forces the need to add some extra information. Namely, each individual
needs to know her own crowding type due to the subtraction of coordinate
↵icisi . This is a consequence of removing individual i from the aggregate l
ci
si
and assigning social weight to lcisi   1 instead. However, this only means
that individual i has no social weight on her own utility, rather she has an
individual value for that decision, !isi (which might nevertheless encompass
a social interpretation of personal values). The aforementioned need for the
knowledge of an individual’s own crowding type, reveals how individuals
may retrieve diﬀerent information from the same aggregated structure of a
strategy class.
Given a decision game   and a strategy profile s, the best response of
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individual i 2 I is
bri(s i) ⌘ br(ci, ei, vi;L(s, c)) = argmax
d2A
{!vid + ~↵ei(d) ·~l(d)  ↵eicid }.
A strategy profile s is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if, for every i 2 I, si =
bri(s i). In a given social context extension, individuals with a same social
type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej) = (c, e) that make the same decision si = sj = d
have the same individual best response valuation domain N(d, c, e;L) ⌘
N(si, ci, ei;L(s, c)). Note that the best response utility Nash domains of
social contexts are characterized by the best response valuation domains of
social context extensions, since
N(d, c;L) =
[
e
N(d, c, e;L).
To characterize the best response valuation domains, we are going to define
for a given strategy profile s conformity thresholds Tei(si ! d; s i), that
represent the surplus quantity that individual i has from social externalities,
that could create an incentive for her to change from her current decision
si to decision d. This threshold does not depend on the valuation type of
the individual, but rather on the externality context (s, c, e). In particular,
as referred, it depends on the individual social type and the strategy class
to which s belongs. Let us first define the auxiliar externality type-threshold
between two decisions d, d0 2 A,
T¯e(d
0, d;L) ⌘ ~↵e(d) ·~l(d)  ~↵e(d0) ·~l(d0).
Given a strategy profile s, the conformity thresholds are given for each in-
dividual i 2 I with externality type ei and for all decisions d 2 A \ {si},
by
Tei(si ! d; s i) ⌘ T¯ei(si, d;L(s, c)) + ↵eicisi ,
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which will be useful to rewrite using strategy classes,
T(ci,ei)(si ! d;L(s, c)) ⌘ Tei(si ! d; s i).
The notation reflects the idea of social incentive towards decision d from
strategy si. Thus, this is the quantity by which !visi (the value of decision
si) has to overcome !vid (the value of decision d), so that decision si is
still ‘preferable’ for an individual with social type (ci, ei) in the externality
context (s, c, e). Observe that when we talk about incentives for player i
to change her decision, we might be talking about desincentives, depending
upon the sign of the conformity threshold T(ci,ei)(si ! d;L(s, c)). Two
opposite extreme cases appear when ~↵ei(si) has only positive coordinates
and ~↵ei(d) has only negative coordinates, making the threshold negative,
thus a desincentive to change; or when the opposite happens, making the
threshold positive, thus an incentive to change. Concluding, incentives or
desincentives are provoked by the relation between negative and positive
coordinates in the social preference matrix.
Lemma 2 (Best response valuation domains characterization). The best
response valuation domains N(d, c, e;L) consist of all ~! 2 RnA with the
following properties:
(i) !d 2 R;
(ii) !d0 2 R satisfying the following threshold inequality
!d0  !d   T(c,e)(d! d0;L) (2.1)
for every decision d0 2 A \ {d}.
Hence, N (s, c, e) is non-empty and contains an open set in the space
(RnA)nI .
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Decision tilings.
The characterization of the Nash valuation domains for every strategy profile
s, provides the full characterization of the relation between valuations and
strategies for a given social profile (c, e). That is, for any given valuation
profile we know what are the possible Nash equilibrium strategies under that
social profile. This characterization is summarized in the decision tiling
DT (c, e) ⌘
[
s
N (s, c, e).
By theorem 5 we can describe the decision tiling according to the type map
and strategy classes as the union of the product of convex sets,
DT (t) =
[
L
⇥t2TN(t;L(s, c)).
In figures 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 we show examples of decision tilings for
the class of decision games  2,2. The interaction variables are summarized
by Att0 ⌘ ↵tt01 + ↵tt02 which characterize the domains. The axis are given
by x = !t11   !t12 and y = !t21   !t22 . The advantage of dimension 2 is the
geometric representation allowing a visualization of the results. Note that
for all i, j 2 I, Rij 2 {A11, A12, A22, A21}. The strategies are characterized
by the pair (l1, l2) which indicate, respectively, the number of individuals of
type 1 and type 2 in decision 1. There are nt individuals of each type. This
is based on [43] where the full characterization of these decisions tilings is
done.
2.2.5 Reciprocal relations and cycles
A natural follow-up question is whether the decision tiling covers the whole
valuation space RnA . This amounts to the question of existence of a pure
Nash equilibrium and can be formulated more precisely in the following
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Figure 2.1: The benchmark decision tiling for the class of  2,2 decision games.
There are no interactions: A11 = A22 = A12 = A21 = 0. There are only
type-symmetric strategies, except on the axis.
way: given a social profile (c, e), when is the problem of existence of a Nash
equilibrium independent of the choice of the personal profile? Are there
conditions that can be imposed on the social profile so that a pure Nash
equilibrium always exist?
The question of existence is one of the major issues in game theory. In
finite games, since a mixed equilibrium always exists, as proven by Nash [32],
the question is whether a pure equilibrium exists. A major class of games that
has drawn considerable atention in the literature for always possessing a pure
Nash equilibrium is the class of potential games, introduced by Rosenthal
[38], and later classified and generalized by Monderer and Shapley [31]. We
will look at the problem of asking whether it is possible to impose symmetries
in the relation of influences between individuals and guarantee the existence
of a pure equilibrium, independent of their personal valuations. Note that if
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Figure 2.2: The decision tiling for a  2,2 decision game when A11 > 0,
A22 > 0, A12 > 0 and A21 > 0. All equilibria are type-symmetric. There are
multiple equilibria in the intersection areas.
it would be possible to choose their personal valuation, then the first sections
completely solve the problem.
Definition 2 (Strong reciprocity). A social profile has strong reciprocity if
↵ija = ↵
ji
a for every individuals i, j 2 I and for every action a 2 A.
A decision game has strong reciprocity if its social profile has strong
reciprocity. Note that this is a strong symmetry property imposed on ev-
ery pairwise relation of individuals. The eﬀect is that when an individual
changes its decision she will provoke the same externalities as she will incur,
which leads improvements on best replies to ‘flow’ on the same direction,
and ultimately to the existence of a potential function.
Result 1. A decision game with strong reciprocity is a potential game.
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Figure 2.3: The area of the decision tiling for a  2,2 decision game where
non-type symmetric Nash domains will lie. In this case we considered 4
individuals in each type to show the non-type symmetric domains. Here
there are only intra-type influences. A22 < A11 < 0, A12 = A21 = 0.
Result 2. Every decision game with strong reciprocity has a pure Nash equi-
librium.
The two results are interconnected. Result 2 is a consequence of Result 1,
as every potential game has a pure Nash equilibrium. The proof of existence
is derived directly from a theorem by Le Breton and Weber in [8], and their
proof, which is for a more general class of games is done by direct construction
of a potential. The proof of result 1 in our case could be done directly from
corollary 2.9 in [31] by Monderer and Shapley, without explicit construction
of the potential, but we will omitt such a proof. Observe that a consequence
of Result 2 is that for every social profile (c, e) with strong reciprocity the
decision tiling covers the valuation space, i.e. DT (t) = RnA . The strong
reciprocity condition is a rather strong symmetry condition, which works as
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Figure 2.4: The area of the decision tiling for a  2,2 decision game where
non-type symmetric Nash domains will lie and inter-type interactions are
turned on. In this case A11 < 0, A22 < 0, A12 < 0, A21 = 0.
a suﬃciency condition for the existence, but is far from necessary, much in
the same way being a potential game is a suﬃcient condition for existence,
but not necessary. The next question we will focus is: under which conditions
is it possible to relax the assumption, i.e. unbalance the relation ↵ija 6= ↵jia ,
and still guarantee a Nash equilibrium? Naturally, we need at least two
types of individuals to do this, and then look at the intertype relations,
since intratype relations are by definition symmetric. Hence, the following
corollary holds for all games  1,nA .
Corollary 4. Every decision game with only one type of individuals has a
pure nash equilibrium.
The idea behind potential games guaranteing a Nash equilibrium, inde-
pendently of the valuation profile, builds upon the fact that when an individ-
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ual changes her decision she aﬀects the utility of the remaining individuals
the same exact same way she is aﬀected by them. When that’s not the case,
an incentive for her to change could be a desincentive for other individuals
to accept the change. Nevertheless, when only positive externalities are in
place, the idea still holds, since the utility of every individual grows with
each unilateral change and eventually individuals will stop changing, if not
before, at least when they have made the same decision. This is the basic
idea behind the proof of the next theorem.
Theorem 6. Every social conformity game has a pure Nash equilibrium.
Recall that social conformity games have only positive externalities, and
as we have proven in previous section, there will be only type symmetric
equilibria. Type-symmetry itself, however, does not play a relevant part,
and is not a base for a suﬃcient condition. When we increase the number
of types, the intertype externalities may be strong enough to prevent an
equilibrium. When the number of types increase, the interactions between
individuals of diﬀerent types may be unbalanced (not strongly reciprocal)
or with diﬀerent signs, and this is where a new condition must work. Note
that even if the interactions are balanced but with a diﬀerent sign (hence
introducing negative externalities) an equilibrium might not exist. The next
example, although in a more informal language, gives a precise idea of the
type of problems that can occur when the number of types grows, and we
loosen the strong reciprocity condition. This also sets up the motivation for
our next definition.
Example 1 (Cat and mouse externalities). Suppose there are two players
(the cat and the mouse) and two possible actions (locations). Both players are
personally indiferent between one action or the other. The mouse wants to
choose a diﬀerent strategy than the cat, and the cat wants to choose the same
strategy as the mouse. No strategy can be an equilibrium, as one of them
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Figure 2.5: The time evolution of the probabilities of individuals under the
replicator dynamics forming a stable cycle for a  2,2 decision game. There
are 2 individuals of each type and the parameters are A11 =  0.1, A12 = 3,
A21 =  10, A22 = 0; n1 = n2 = 2, x = 0.4, y = 0.6. The initial probabilities
are p1(0) = 0.5, p2(0) = 0.6 for type 1 and q1(0) = 0.4 and q2(0) = 0.3 for
type 2.
always has an incentive to deviate. This is essencially general for decision
games  2,2 (with two types of individuals and two actions) where A12 > 0
and A21 < 0. No type-symmetric strategy will prevail, and non-symmetric
strategies will require a balance between the remaining parameters. Similar
examples can be found in a game leading to a limit cycle of the replicator
dynamics in (Soeiro et al 2014 [43] which is shown in figure 2.5), and in an
example where a celebrity and the public must choose locations in (Wooders
2006 [52]).
In such games with ‘cat chases mouse’ like externalities, if the utilities
are based solely on externalities, there is no pure Nash equilibria. Note
however, that using the results from the previous sections it is easy to find,
for any of the players, a set of personal values for each decision such that an
equilibrium exist. (Say the cat values action a1 relative to a2 high enough
that is indiferent to the externality. Any allocation can be an equilibrium
with the right set of personal values; those inside the Nash domains found
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Figure 2.6: A relation between the non-type-symmetric Nash domains for
the decision tiling for a  2,2 decision game without weak reciprocity. In
this case A12 > 0 and A21 < 0 which creates a space between the domains
containing valuations for which there is no pure Nash equilibrium.
before.)
Definition 3 (Weak reciprocity). A social profile has weak reciprocity if for
every individuals i, j 2 I and actions a, a0 2 A, sgn(↵ija ) = sgn(↵jia0).
The condition of weak reciprocity implies that changes in the strategies
of individuals will provoke externalities in the same direction, and thus break
the type of ‘cat chases mouse’ externalities. This will prove to be crucial to
decision games in  2,2, such as that of the previous example.
Theorem 7. A weakly reciprocal decision game with two types and two de-
cisions has a pure Nash equilibrium.
An example of a part of the decision tiling for the class of  2,2 with
and without weak reciprocity is shown in figures 2.6 and 2.7. The examples
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Figure 2.7: A relation between the non-type-symmetric Nash domains for
the decision tiling of a  2,2 decision game with weak reciprocity. In this case
A12 < 0 and A21 < 0 which provokes the intersection of the domains creating
multiplicity of equilibrium instead of an empty space.
ilustrate that externalities may create a hole on the decision tiling, i.e. ilus-
trate the cases when there will be a space between Nash domains with no
equilibrium, and why weak reciprocity covers that space.
Corollary 5. Social congestion games with two types and two actions have
a pure Nash equilibrium.
The fact that weak reciprocity does not hold when the number of types or
decisions increases is because the type of ‘cat chases mouse externalities’ can
be constructed on a second level of reasoning. Say there are three individuals
and only negative externalities. The absolute value of externalities may
induce that individual 1 is running away from individual 2, individual 3 is
running away from individual 1, and individual 2 is running from 3. When
there are only two possible actions, this creates a similar eﬀect as if individual
2.2. PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA 47
1 was pursuing individual 3 (similar to following a positive externality). The
same idea can be developped based on 3 decisions and 2 types. This is better
explained in the next example.
Example 2 (The hermitt, the politician and the crowd.). Consider the
following game construction. Suppose there are only negative externalities,
so the game is weakly reciprocal. We will be working on the absolute values
of those externalities. There are three types of players and two locations,
the city and the countryside. The hermitt hates the crowd, and wants to be
alone. The politician wants to build a society, so he hates the hermitt. The
crowd is misinformed, so they hate the politician. The rest of externalities
are negligible. All of them are indiferent between city and countryside. There
is no pure Nash equilibrium, because no two types together can be a mutual
best response. (Note that there are only type-symmetric best-responses, and
even so there is no equilibrium.)
Although the example shows why weak reciprocity does not hold as a
suﬃcient condition in games with a higher number of types, it is in fact a
necessary condition if the parameters of the game that are left free, include
the values in the social profile. Just observe that in that case example 1 can
always be constructed if weak reciprocity fails. For any number of players.
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2.2.6 Proofs
The proofs are essencially divided into three groups. The first part is based
on the idea of conformity obstruction, or tendency to conform, and uses
a general version of lemma 1. The second part is based on the relation
between best responses and conformity thresholds. The third part relates to
the problem of existence and is based on improvement of best responses.
We start with an auxiliar result. Let us define for any two individuals
i, j 2 I and d 2 A, the following vector,
~"ij(d) ⌘ ~↵ei(d)  ~↵ej (d).
Lemma 3. Consider a decision game   and a Nash equilibrium s. For every
i, j 2 I, if si 6= sj then
!visi   !
vj
si + !
vj
sj   !visj   ↵
eicj
sj + ↵
ejci
si + ~"ij(sj) ·~l(sj)  ~"ij(si) ·~l(si).
Proof. Consider a decision game   and let s be a Nash equilibrium of  . We
have that
ui(si; s i)   ui(sj ; s i)
and
uj(sj ; s j)   uj(si; s j).
Now observe that
ui(sj ; s i) = uj(sj ; s j)  !vjsj + !visj + ~"ij(sj) ·~l(sj) + ↵
eicj
sj
and similarly
uj(si; s j) = ui(si; s i)  !visi + !
vj
si   ~"ij(si) ·~l(si) + ↵ejcisi .
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which concludes the proof.
Proofs based on confomity obstruction
Lemma 1
Proof. Lemma 3 imples that
!visi   !
vj
si + !
vj
sj   !visj   ↵
eicj
sj + ↵
ejci
si   2nIdist(ei, ej)
and for d equal to si or sj
2|!vid   !vjd |   ↵eicjsj + ↵ejcisi   2nIdist(ei, ej).
Thus,
dist(~!vi , ~!vj )   Rij(s)/2  nIdist(ei, ej).
Theorem 1
Proof. Theorem 1 can be restated as follows: let s be a Nash equilibrium
and i, j 2 I be two individuals of the same social type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej), such
that si 6= sj and Rij(s) > 0. For all !ˆi 2 W (~!j) and !ˆj 2 W (~!i) and for
all 0 < " < Rij(s)/2, the open balls, in the l1 norm, centered at !ˆi and !ˆj ,
with radius " and Rij(s)/2  " do not intersect,
B"(!ˆi) \BRij(s)/2 "(!ˆj) = ;.
This follows directly from Lemma 1.
Theorems 3 and 4
Proof. (of Theorem 3) Let (s, c) be a social context and s be a Nash equi-
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librium. Observe that for an individual i 2 P (d, c), if her utility is replaced
by any utility in con(U(d, c)), it follows from the cone structure of the Nash
domain (see Remark 1) that si = d is still a best response. Now note that
if for two distinct decisions d, d0 2 A and crowding type c 2 C, individ-
uals in P (d, c) and P (d0, c) have a tendency to conform in s, then for all
Ui 2 con(U(d, c)) and Uj 2 con(U(d0, c)), the individuals i and j would also
have a tendency to conform. Thus, by Lemma 1, their utilities must diﬀer
at least in decision d and d0.
Theorem 4 follows from Theorem 3.
Proofs based on conformity thresholds
Lemma 2
Proof. The strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium if, and only if,
ui(si, s i)   ui(d, s i)
for every d 2 D and i 2 I. Let ti = (ci, ei, vi) = (c, e, v), the utility function
can be rewritten explicitly as
u(i; s) = !vsi + ↵
ec
si (l
c
si   1) +
nCX
c0 6=c
↵ec
0
si l
c0
si(s).
Letting t = ti and ltd = l
t
d(s), we get
!vsi   ↵ecsi +
nCX
c0=1
↵ec
0
si l
c0
si   !vd +
nCX
c0=1
↵ec
0
d l
c0
d .
Rearranging the terms, the previous inequality is equivalent to
!vsi   !vd + ↵ecsi +
nCX
c0=1
⇣
↵ec
0
d l
c0
d   ↵ec
0
si l
c0
si
⌘
.
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Hence, si is a best response for i if for every decision d
!vd  !vsi   T(c,e)(si ! d;L).
Theorems 2 and 5
Start with the following construction. Let t be a type profile and s be a t
admissible strategy profile, and denote its strategy class by L ⌘ L(s, c). For
every t 2 T , let St ⌘ {si 2 A : i 2 It} and let us use the superscript t on
the parameters to mean the corresponding coordinate of t, for example, if
t = (c, e, v), then ↵ttd means ↵
ec
d . Since s is t admissible, for each type t 2 T ,
there is at most one decision d 2 St such that ↵ttd > 0 (if there were two,
they would violate the admissibility condition on the valuation map). Let
us start by defining, for every type t 2 T ,
d⇤t ⌘ argmax
d2St
{↵ttd }.
Let i⇤ 2 It be an individual such that si⇤ = d⇤t , and let
✏t(s) ⌘
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if ↵ttd⇤t   0;
 
↵ttd⇤t
2
if ↵ttd⇤t < 0.
Let ⌦ ⌘ ⇥t2T⌦t, where for a given type t 2 T , ⌦t are the open sets of all !t
with the following properties:
(i) !td⇤t 2 R;
(ii) if A \ St 6= ; then, for every d 2 A \ St,
!td  min
si2St
{!tsi   T(c,e)(si ! d;L)}; (2.2)
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(iii) if St \ {d⇤t } 6= ;, then, for every si 2 St \ {d⇤t }
!td⇤t + T(c,e)(si ! d⇤t ;L) + ✏t(s)  !tsi  !td⇤t   T(c,e)(d⇤t ! si;L)  ✏t(s).
(2.3)
Proof. (of Theorem 5) The proof is constructed over one type t = (c, e, v) 2 T
by showing that ; 6= ⌦t 2 N(t;L), which holds for all t 2 T , and thus
⌦ 2 N (s, c, e). As we will be refering always to the same type and to the
same strategy, let us, for simplicity of notation, omit the subscript and the
strategy class, hence, denote
T (d! d0) ⌘ T(c,e)(d! d0;L)
Let’s start by showing that ⌦t 6= ;. Observe that it is enough to show that
equation (2.3) in the defintion of ⌦t refers to a non-degenerated interval,
which translates into
 T (d⇤t ! si)  T (si ! d⇤t )   2✏t(s).
Hence, as
 T (d⇤t ! si)  T (si ! d⇤t ) =  ↵ttsi   ↵ttd⇤t ,
we get
 ↵ttsi   ↵ttd⇤t   0 when ↵ttd⇤t   0,
and
 ↵ttsi   ↵ttd⇤t    ↵ttd⇤t when ↵ttd⇤t < 0.
Now recall that being t admissible implies that for individuals i and j of
the same type using diﬀerent strategies Rij(s) = ↵ttsi + ↵
tt
sj  0. As s is t
admissible, there is for each type t 2 T at most one decision d 2 St such
that ↵ttd > 0, and that decision is by definition d
⇤
t , hence, ↵ttsi  0.
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To see that ⌦ ⇢ N (s, c, e) we will show that the two equations setforth
in the definition of the sets ⌦t are suﬃcient to guarantee that inequalities
(2.1) in lemma 2 are satisfied for every individual and every decision. It
is straightforward to see from equation (2.2) that no individual wants to
change to decisions d /2 St. Let’s now check that equation (2.3) implies that
individuals do not want to change between decisions within St. Individuals
choosing d⇤t do not want to change to other decisions in St, since ✏t(s)   0
and
!td⇤t   !tsi + T (d⇤t ! si) + ✏t(s).
An individual i 6= i⇤ 2 It doesn’t want to change to d⇤t , since ✏t(s)   0 and
!tsi   !td⇤t + T (si ! d⇤t ) + ✏t(s).
Finally, to see that an individual i 6= j 2 It does not want to change to any
decision sj 6= d⇤t ,
!tsi   !tsj   T (si ! d⇤t ) + T (d⇤t ! sj) + 2✏t(s),
but
T (si ! d⇤t ) + T (d⇤t ! sj) = T (si ! sj) + ↵ttd⇤t ,
hence,
!tsi   !tsj + T (si ! sj).
Theorem 2 follows from 5.
54 CHAPTER 2. THE DECISION GAME
Proofs based on type improvement paths (existence of NE)
The following will be used in the proofs:
1) We call t-rearangement to a strategy profile s⇤ obtained from strategy
s by changing all individuals of type t 2 T to their best response, while
maintaining the remaining I \ It players fixed. Note that by corollary 4 this
is always possible.
2) Given a game with PBI and a strategy profile s, add a new player i
of type ti, and place her in her best response a to strategy profile s: i) for
all other players only the payoﬀ associated to action a has changed; ii) no
individual of the same type that is also choosing a has an incentive to change
(since they are of the same type, same payoﬀs).
Theorem 6
Proof. The proof follows by induction. By corollary 4  1,nA always has a
pure Nash equilibrium. We will now add one more player of a diﬀerent type.
Recall that there are only positive externalities. Place the new individual
i1, of the second type, in her best response, say it’s action a. After a t1-
rearangement individuals of type t1 can only change their decision towards
decision a. But this increases the payoﬀ of i1, so she is still in her best
response and we’ve reached an equilibrium. Add now a second player. If
she also chooses a, the reasoning goes as before. If she chooses a0, then,
after a t1-rearangement the only question is whether individual i1 wants to
move. If she does, it must be towards action a0 for this is the only payoﬀ
that has increased. So let her change and we’ve reached an equilibrium,
as before. The reasoning continues ad infinitum. Note that this reasoning
did not depend on the type of the players added, nor on the number of
decisions.
2.2. PURE NASH EQUILIBRIA 55
Theorem 7
Proof. The proof follows by induction as before. By corollary 4  1,nA always
has a pure Nash equilibrium. We will now add a player of type t2. Place the
new individual i, of the second type, in her best response, say it’s action a1.
After a t1-rearangement individuals of type t1 can only change their decision
in two ways: i) out of decision a1 if ↵12a1 < 0; or ii) towards decision a1 if
↵12a1 > 0. In both cases the payoﬀ of i increased, since the game is weakly
reciprocal and sgn(↵21a1) = sgn(↵
21
a2) = sgn(↵
12
a1). Hence, we’ve reached an
equilibrium. Add now a second player of type t2. Two cases: (i) if she also
chooses a1, after a t1-rearrangement, the reasoning goes as before; (ii) if she
chooses a2, after a t1-rearangement the only question is whether individual
i wants to move to decision a2. If she does, we are in case (i).
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2.3 Mixed Nash equilibria
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution over the space of pure strate-
gies A. The space of mixed strategies is thus the simplex  nA . We represent
the mixed strategy of an individual i by a vector ~ i = ( i1, . . . , inA) where
~ i(a) ⌘  ia is the probability that ~ i assigns to a 2 A, and
P
a2A  
i
a = 1.
The support of a mixed strategy, supp(~ i), is the subset of pure strategies to
which ~ i assigns positive probability. A mixed-strategy profile of the game is
an element of   ⌘ ( nA)nI with its coordinates being the mixed strategies
of every individual i 2 I, denoted   = (~ 1, . . . ,~ nI ).
The payoﬀ to individual i of the mixed-strategy profile   is the expected
value with respect to   of the pure strategy payoﬀs, which, with the standard
slight abuse of notation, is denoted u(i; ) ⌘ P
s2S
QnI
j=1  
j
sju(i; s). In a deci-
sion game with the PSS property, the personal part will remain separable,
and only the social component will have terms depending on the remain-
ing strategies. Therefore, the payoﬀs for the mixed strategy profile can be
written using general social externality functions ei : A⇥ [0, 1](n 1) ! R as
u(i; ) =
X
a2A
 ia
 
!ia + e
i
a(  i)
 
Consider a non-degenerate mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium  ⇤ 2  .
Regarding the relation between the payoﬀs associated to each underlying
pure strategy two general properties are useful:
u(i; ⇤) = !ia + e
i
a( 
⇤
 i), 8a 2 supp(~ ⇤i ) (2.4)
u(i; ⇤)   !ia + eia( ⇤ i), 8a /2 supp(~ ⇤i ). (2.5)
Remark 2 (Personal and social balance). Consider a non-degenerate mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium  ⇤ 2  . The following holds for every i 2 I and
a1, a2 2 A,
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(i) if a1, a2 2 supp(~ i),  !i(a1, a2) =  ei(a2, a1;  i);
(ii) if a1 2 supp(~ i) and a2 /2 supp(~ i),  !i(a1, a2)    ei(a2, a1;  i).
The remark is useful when looking at individuals with the same type, as
diﬀerences in their personal and social balance will be given by diﬀerences
in their strategy through the externality function.
2.3.1 Type symmetries under DI and PBI
Proposition 1. In a decision game with PSS, DI and PBI properties, the
expected value of ~ i with respect to   i is given by
u(i; ) =
X
a2A
 ia
0@!ia +X
j 6=i
↵ija  
j
a
1A .
Lemma 4. Let   2   be a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium and i, j 2 I two
individuals of the same social type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej) ⌘ (c, e). For any action
a 2 supp(~ i) \ supp(~ j) we have
u(i; )  u(j; ) = !ia   !ja   ↵eca
 
 ia    ja
 
The above lemma relates to that of conformity obstruction. Note that
for two individuals of the same type (i.e. individuals that besides the same
social type, have the same valuation type) we have !ia = !
j
a. Therefore, the
diference in their payoﬀs in a Nash equilibrium is bounded by the externality
they provoke on eachother, if their supports intersect. Consider the following
partition of the set of pure strategies according to the influence individuals
of type t have on eachother,
A t ⌘ {a 2 A : ↵tta < 0}; A0t ⌘ {a 2 A : ↵tta = 0}; A+t ⌘ {a 2 A : ↵tta > 0}.
The set A t is formed by the subset of pure strategies where individuals of
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type t do not like to be together. The subsets A0t and A+t are formed, re-
spectively, by those pure strategies where individuals of type t are indiﬀerent
to eachother, and where they like to be together. Let us now partition the
support of a mixed strategy ~ i of individual i 2 I according to these subsets.
Define supp(~ i)  ⌘ supp(~ i) \ A t , and analogously, define supp(~ i)0 and
supp(~ i)+. Putting together the result of lemma 4 and the above partitions
leads to the following counterintuitive observations.
Remark 3 (Type utility ordering). Let   2   be a mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium and i 2 It. The following comparisons hold for all j 2 It,
(i) if a 2 supp(~ i)+, then  ia <  ja ) u(i; ) > u(j; );
(ii) if a 2 supp(~ i) , then  ia >  ja ) u(i; ) > u(j; );
(iii) if a 2 supp(~ i)0, then u(i; )  u(j; );
(iv) if a 2 supp(~ i)0 and supp0(~ j) 6= ; then u(i; ) = u(j; );
(v) if a 2 supp(~ i) \ supp(~ j) \ A0t , then u(i; ) = u(j; ),  ia =  ja.
Lemma 5 (Type-asymmetry obstructions). Let   2   be a non-degenerated
mixed-strategy profile that is a Nash equilibrium. Consider two individuals
of the same type i, j 2 It such that ~ i 6= ~ j and u(i; ) > u(j; ). The
following holds
(i) supp(~ i)+ ✓ supp(~ j)+;
(ii) supp(~ i)0 = ;;
(iii) supp(~ i)  6= ;.
Furthermore, if supp(~ i) = supp(~ j) ⌘ a, then
X
a2a
1
↵tta
= 0. (2.6)
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The diﬀerence in individual strategies is limited by the choice of supports.
In particular, when for some game the condition given by equation 2.6 never
holds, then individuals choosing the same support will have to play the same
strategy. The next definition and results are based on this idea.
Definition 4 (Mixed Type-Symmetry condition MTS). A support a ✓ A
of a mixed strategy satisfies the mixed type-symmetry condition (MTS) for a
given type t if X
a⇤2a
Y
a 6=a⇤
↵tta 6= 0.
Note that the MTS is in fact broken in equation 2.6 of lemma 5. As an
example of why this condition can be useful, think of a game with only two
possible actions, which leads to only three possibilities of distinct supports
(including singletons). Individuals of the same type can either play a pure
strategy or the same non-degenerate mixed strategy.
Remark 4. Consider a decision game with only two possible actions A =
{a1, a2}. If for some type t we have ↵tt1 +↵tt2 6= 0, then all individuals of type
t either play a pure strategy or the same strictly mixed strategy.
Let us now go back to the general case and define a notation for the
diﬀerence in payoﬀs for any two decisions chosen by an individual i, without
considering the influence of another individual j1,
 ui(a1, a2;  {j1}) =  !
i(a1, a2) +
X
j 6=i,j1
↵ija1 
j
a1  
X
j 6=i,j1
↵ija2 
j
a2 .
Note that for two individuals of the same taste type, i.e. (vi, ei) = (vj , ej) =
(v, e), this diﬀerence is the same3  ui(a1, a2;  {j}) =  uj(a1, a2;  {i}).
Using lemma 5 we will prove that for individuals of the same type, that is
when we add the restriction of the same crowding for these individuals, the
MTS condition will in fact force them to play the same, unique, strategy.
3This can be seen by writing  ui(a1, a2;  {j}) =  !v(a1, a2) + e(a1, a2;  {i,j}).
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Let us first define for two individuals i, j 2 It, the quantity
ht(a1, a2;  {i,j}) ⌘  ui(a1, a2;  {j}).
Theorem 8 (Type-symmetry). In a Nash equilibrium, if two individuals of
the same type i, j 2 It choose the same support a ⇢ A, and the support sat-
isfies the MTS condition for type t, then ~ i = ~ j. Furthermore, the support
a uniquely determines their (equilibrium) strategy in terms of the strategies
of the other individuals   {i,j}. In the case of non-singleton supports it is
given by
 a⇤ =
1 +
P
a h
t(a, a⇤;  {i,j})/↵tta
1 +
P
a 6=a⇤ ↵tta⇤/↵tta
for all a⇤ 2 a.
Note that the strategy characterized above is an intersection of best re-
sponses, not exactly the unique best response for the individuals. That’s why
in the theorem we mention it as an equilibrium strategy and not the best re-
sponse to   {i,j}. Observe also, that by theMTS condition, the denominator
is not zero and the strategy is well defined. Naturally it must satisfy being
a probability. Another interesting remark is that the theorem does not hold
for individuals of the same taste type but with diﬀerent crowding types.
Similarly to what we’ve done in the case of pure strategies, let us de-
fine the mixed type-aggregate decision matrix M( ) with coordinates, M ta ⌘
M ta( ) ⌘
P
j2It  
j
a,
M( ) ⌘
0BBB@
M11 . . . M
nT
1
... . . .
...
M1nA . . . M
nT
nA
1CCCA .
Let us denote the number of individuals of type t using a mixed strategy by
mt( ) ⌘ {i 2 It : 0 <  ia < 1, a 2 A}.
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The mixed conformity threshold excluding type t is defined as
Tt(a1, a2;M t) ⌘
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a2M
t0
a2  
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a1M
t0
a1 + ↵
tt
a2(mt   1).
Recall that
Tt(a1, a2;L) =
X
t0
↵tt
0
a2 l
t0
a2  
X
t0
↵tt
0
a1 l
t0
a1 .
Using Remark 4 we have the following corollary for  nT ,2 games.
Corollary 6 (Dichotomous games). Consider the class  nT ,2 of decision
games with only two possible actions A = {a1, a2}. If for some type t we
have ↵tt1 + ↵tt2 6= 0, then in a Nash equilibrium, the strategy of type t must
be composed by a subset of individuals in pure strategies and a subset of
individuals playing with the following mixed strategy,
 a1 =
Tt(a1, a2;L) + Tt(a1, a2;M t)  !t(a1, a2)
(↵tta2 + ↵
tt
a1)(mt   1)
and  a2 = 1   a1 .
Note that the subsets mentioned in the above corollary might be empty.
In particular, by theorem 4, if ↵tt1 + ↵tt2 > 0 then mt 2 {0, nt}, that is, all
strategies are type-symmetric in equilibrium. The next corollary is just a
simplification of the above, but will be useful later. Let us denote for the
class of homogeneous dichotomous case  1,2 (only one type of individuals
and two actions) the decision threshold
T (l1) ⌘  (↵1 + ↵2)l1 + ↵2(n  1).
Corollary 7 (Homogeneous dichotomous games). Consider the class  1,2
of decision games with only one type of individuals and two possible actions
A = {a1, a2}. If ↵1 + ↵2 6= 0, then in a Nash equilibrium, there is a subset
of individuals in pure strategies and a subset of individuals playing with the
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following mixed strategy,
 a1 =
T (l1)  !(a1, a2)
(↵2 + ↵1)(m  1)
with  a2 = 1   a1 .
As in the non-homogeneous case, by theorem 4, if ↵1 + ↵2 > 0 then
m 2 {0, n}, where n is the number of individuals.
In the general case, if individuals use diﬀerent probabilities, then the
intersection of their support must be contained in some ‘null externality
set’. This is concretized in the next remark.
Remark 5. Let A⇤ ✓ supp(~ i) \ supp(~ j) be the maximal subset for which
the MTS condition holds. If ui = uj, then for all a 2 A⇤ players must use
the same probability, that is  ia =  
j
a.
2.3.2 Proofs
Proposition 1
Just observe that because of the DI property the payoﬀ of each pure strat-
egy where i and j interact is the same whatever are the strategies of other
individuals. By linearity of the expected value, the product can be separated
into a sum of all the strategies, which equate to 1 since they are a probability
distribution.
Lemma 4
Proof. Observe that in a Nash equilibrium   for all actions a, a0 2 supp(~ i),
the payoﬀs equate u(i; a,  i) = u(i; a0,  i) (see Equation 2.4). Now, for
two individuals i, j 2 I of the same social type (ci, ei) = (cj , ej) ⌘ (c, e), this
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means that, for i,
!ia +
X
j0 6=i,j
↵ej
0
a  
j0
a + ↵
ec
a  
j
a = !
i
a0 +
X
j0 6=i,j
↵ej
0
a0  
j0
a0 + ↵
ec
a0 
j
a0
and for j
!ja +
X
j0 6=i,j
↵ej
0
a  
j0
a + ↵
ec
a  
i
a = !
j
a0 +
X
j0 6=i,j
↵ej
0
a0  
j0
a0 + ↵
ec
a0 
i
a0
Lemma 5
Let us start by fixing a notation for the value of a given pure strategy a for
individuals of type t not taking into account individuals i and j,
V ta (  {i,j}) ⌘ !ta +
X
j0 6=i,j
↵tj
0
a  
j0
a .
Now observe that if   is a Nash equilibrium, for all a 2 supp(~ i) the utility
of individual i of type t is u(i; ) = V ta (  {i,j}) + ↵tta  
j
a.
Proof. Consider a Nash equilibrium   where ~ i 6= ~ j and u(i; ) > u(j; ).
Proof of (i). Suppose there is a 2 A such that a 2 supp(~ i)+ and
a /2 supp(~ j)+. Let’s observe that player j would have an incentive to
change to the pure strategy a, which concludes the proof. As   is a Nash
equilibrium and a /2 supp(~ j)+ we have u(i; ) = V ta (  {i,j}) + ↵tta 0. Since
individuals i and j are of the same type, if j changes to a, then uj(a,  j) =
V ta (  {i,j}) + ↵tta  ia and ↵tta > 0. Hence, uj(a,  j) > u(i; ) > u(j; ).
Proof of (ii). Suppose a 2 supp(~ i)0. Then, by the same reasoning
uj(a,  j) = u(i; ) > u(j; ).
Proof of (iii). Suppose supp(~ i)  = ;. From (i) and (ii) we have
supp(~ i) ✓ supp(~ j). Furtermore supp(~ i) = supp(~ i)+. By Remark 3,
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 ia <  
j
a for all a 2 supp(~ i). This is impossible since
P
i  
i
a =
P
j  
j
a = 1.
Let us now prove the last part of the theorem. First, note that as each
individual earns the same in every pure strategy contained in the support
of its mixed strategy, the following must hold for every pair of decisions
a, a0 2 supp(~ i),
↵tta0 
j
a0   ↵tta  ja = V ta (  {i,j})  V ta0(  {i,j}).
Furthermore, this must hold both for i and j, since V does not depend on
either. Suppose now that supp(~ i) = supp(~ j). This originates a unique
system of equations for the strategy of both individuals. If the strategies of
two individuals of the same type are diﬀerente, i.e. ~ i 6= ~ j , this implies that
the system associated to the above equations, together with the constraintP
i  
i
a = 1, does not have a unique solution. Let us label the elements
of the support supp(~ i) = {1, . . . , n }. Let us use the variable reduction
 n  = 1  
P
a  a. The system can be reduced, and its coeficients can be
represented by the following (n    1)⇥ (n    1) square matrix
B ⌘
0BBBBBBBBBBBBB@
↵tt1  ↵tt2 0 · · · · · · 0
↵tt1 0  ↵tt3 0 · · · 0
...
... . . . 0
↵tt1 0 · · · · · · 0  ↵ttn  1
↵tt1 + ↵
tt
n  ↵
tt
n  · · · · · · · · · ↵ttn 
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCA
The first term of the determinant of the above matrix, calculated in terms
of the last row, is
( 1)n  1+1(↵tt1 + ↵ttn )( 1)n  2
Y
a 6={n  ,1}
↵tta ,
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and the remaining terms are (changing column 1 to ‘place’ a⇤   1)
X
a⇤2{2,...,n  1}
( 1)n  1+a⇤↵ttn ( 1)1+a
⇤ 1↵tt1 ( 1)n  3
Y
a 6={n  ,a⇤,1}
↵tta .
Rearranging the last expression, (noting all exponents of the  1 terms even
out) we get X
a⇤2{2,...,n  1}
Y
a 6=a⇤
↵tta ,
hence,
det(B) = (↵tt1 + ↵
tt
n )
Y
a 6={n  ,1}
↵tta +
X
a⇤2{2,...,n  1}
Y
a 6=a⇤
↵tta ,
therefore
det(B) =
Y
a 6=n 
↵tta +
Y
a 6=1
↵tta +
X
a⇤2{2,...,n  1}
Y
a 6=a⇤
↵tta ,
and finally
det(B) =
X
a⇤2supp(~ i)
Y
a 6=a⇤
↵tta .
To conclude observe that for two players of the same type to play diﬀer-
ent strategies with the same support we wanted det(B) = 0. Noting that
supp(~ i)0 = ;
det(B) = 0)
X
a2supp(~ i)
1
↵tta
= 0.
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Theorem 8
Let us start by the following auxiliar result
Claim 1. Let A be a matrix with zero in all entries except in the diagonal
and columns j1 and j2. We have that
det(A) = (aj1j1aj2j2   aj2j1aj1j2)
Y
i 6={j1,j2}
aii
Proof. Start by observing that a diagonal matrix with one non zero column
has as its determinant the product of the diagonal entries. Now, for the case
with two columns non-zero j1 and j2, we will observe that the only minors
with non-zero determinant are of the form mentioned before. Let’s say we
develop the determinant by column j1. There are only two minors that do
not have a column with zeros, and thus non-zero determinant. These are the
ones with coeﬃcient aj1j1 and aj2j1 . The first minor is in the aforementioned
case. The second minor, with a change of the (old) column j2 to the place of
the (old) column j1 (which was eliminated), becames also the aforementioned
case.
Proof. (of Theorem 8) The proof follows from the proof of Lemma 5 by
finding the solution of the system
↵tta0 
j
a0   ↵tta  ja = V ta (  {i,j})  V ta0(  {i,j})
using Cramer rule.4 Note that it is suﬃcient to write the system in terms of
4This is probably not the simplest nor the more elegant approach.
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decision 1. Let
Ba
⇤ ⌘
0BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB@
↵tt1  ↵tt2 0 · · · 0 V t2   V t1 0 · · · 0
↵tt1 0  ↵tt3 0 V t3   V t1 · · · 0
↵tt1 0
. . . 0
...
... · · · 0
...  ↵tta⇤ 1
... · · · 0
... 0
... 0 · · · 0
... 0 · · · ...  ↵tta⇤+1 · · · 0
... 0 · · · ... ... 0 . . . 0
↵tt1 0 · · · · · · 0
... 0 0  ↵ttn  1
↵tt1 + ↵
tt
n  ↵
tt
n  · · · · · · ↵ttn  V tn    V t1 + ↵ttn  ↵ttn  · · · ↵ttn 
1CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCA
For a subset A⇤ ⇢ A let us define P (A⇤) ⌘ Qa2A\A⇤ ↵tta . We will omitt
the superscripts relative to type t since the proof is done over type t only.
Developping the determinant by the last row, there are two terms not in
↵n  . These are (as before changing column 1 to the pl‘place’ a⇤   1 in the
corresponding non-diagonal minor)
( 1)n 1+1(↵1 + ↵n )(Va⇤   V1)P (a⇤, 1, n )( 1)n 3
+( 1)n 1+a⇤(Vn    V1 + ↵n )( 1)a
⇤ 2P (a⇤, n )( 1)n 3.
This leads to
 (↵1 + ↵n )(Va⇤   V1)P (a⇤, 1, n ) + (Vn    V1 + ↵n )P (a⇤, n ),
and finally
P (a⇤)  (Va⇤   V1)P (a⇤, n )  (Va⇤   V1)P (a⇤, 1) + (Vn    V1)P (a⇤, n ).
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Now the other terms are (adjusting the matrix columns and using Claim 1)
X
a 6=1,a⇤,n 
( 1)n 1+a↵n ( 1)a 2 (↵1(Va⇤   V1)  ↵1(Va   V1))P (1, a, n , a⇤)( 1)n 4
so we get X
a 6=1,a⇤,n 
((Va   V1)  (Va⇤   V1))P (a, a⇤)
rearanging
X
a 6=1,a⇤,n 
(Va   V1)P (a, a⇤)  (Va⇤   V1)
X
a 6=1,a⇤,n 
P (a, a⇤).
Putting all terms together
det(Ba
⇤
) = P (a⇤) +
X
a 6=a⇤
(Va   V1)P (a, a⇤)  (Va⇤   V1)
X
a 6=a⇤
P (a, a⇤)
and finally
det(Ba
⇤
) = P (a⇤) +
X
a
(Va   Va⇤)P (a, a⇤).
The solution, by Cramer rule, is
det(Ba
⇤
)
det(B)
=
P (a⇤) +
P
a(Va   Va⇤)P (a, a⇤)P
a
Q
a0 6=a ↵tta0
when there are no zeros,
det(Ba
⇤
)
det(B)
=
1 +
P
a(Va   Va⇤)(↵tta ) 1
↵tta⇤
P
a(↵
tt
a )
 1
Note that Va   Va⇤ =  !t(a, a⇤) +  et(a, a⇤;  {i,j}). Thus Va   Va⇤ =
ht(a, a⇤;  {i,j}).
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Computations for corollaries of Theorem 8
Theorem 8 yields
 a1 =
1 + ht(a2, a1;  {i,j})/↵tta2
1 + ↵tta1/↵
tt
a2
With two types, ht(a2, a1;  {i,j}) is given by
  !t(a1, a2) 
X
j 6=i,j
↵ija1 
j
a1 +
X
j 6=i,j
↵ija2 
j
a2
which by type
  !t(a1, a2) 
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a1(l
t0
a1 +M
t0
a1) +
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a2(l
t0
a2 +M
t0
a2)
+↵tta2 l
t
a2 + ↵
tt
a2(mt   2)(1   a1)  ↵tta1 lta1   ↵tta1(mt   2) a1
therefore
  !t(a1, a2) 
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a1(l
t0
a1 +M
t0
a1) +
X
t0 6=t
↵tt
0j
a2 (l
t0
a2 +M
t0
a2)
+↵tta2 l
t
a2   ↵tta1 lta1 + ↵tta2(mt   2)  (↵tta2 + ↵tta1)(mt   2) a1
so we get
 a1 =
  !t(a1, a2) +
P
t0
↵tt
0
a2 l
t0
a2  
P
t0
↵tt
0
a1 l
t0
a1 +
P
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a2M
t0
a2  
P
t0 6=t
↵tt
0
a1M
t0
a1 + ↵
tt
a2(mt   1)
(↵tta2 + ↵
tt
a1)(mt   1)
which can be written using the thresholds
 a1 =
T (a1, a2;L) + T t(a1, a2;M)  !t(a1, a2)
(↵tta2 + ↵
tt
a1)(mt   1)
.
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Chapter 3
Socially prone duopolies
The main idea in this chapter is that small price changes are captured by con-
sumers using non-degenerate mixed strategies (called non-loyal consumers).
If pure strategy consumers (loyal consumers) are held constant, a change
in price implicitly determines a unique continuous deviation for non-loyal
consumers and this works as a coordination device for firms. Furthermore,
as it is continuous it stabilizes firms in pure price equilibria. We define an
influence network among consumers based on partial derivatives, and an in-
dex relating to its structural properties, which determines prices and personal
preferences based on the existence of these solutions. When interactions are
dyadic, the index is locally constant, demand depends linearly on prices and
personal valuations determine the equilibrium demand and prices.
3.1 The duopoly setup
We consider the duopoly as being a two stage game. In the first stage,
the firms subgame, two firms independently and simultaneously set a price
for the service they provide: p1 for the service provided by firm 1, p2 for
the service provided by firm 2, defining the price profile p ⌘ (p1, p2). We
assume firms have no costs in providing the service (neither variable nor fixed
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costs).1 In the second stage, the consumers subgame, a finite set of consumers
(individuals) I ⌘ {1, . . . , n} observe the prices set in the first stage and each
consumer i 2 I independently decides the probability  i1 and  i2 of using
each one of the two services S ⌘ {s1, s2}, provided, respectively, by each
one of the two firms. The choice is mandatory i.e.  i1 +  i2 = 1 (there is no
reservation price set exogeneously), which means that given a pair of prices
from the first stage, the choice of a consumer is a probability distribution over
the set of services S provided by firms, i.e. over the space of pure strategies.
Consumers are thus assumed to use standard mixed strategies in the space
S ⌘ Sn. For simplicity of notation we will identify the distribution by a single
parameter ( i, 1    i) ⌘ ( i1, i2) and as such the space of mixed strategies
can be identified with [0, 1]n. The consumers choice is summarized in the
profile of consumer (mixed) strategies denoted by   ⌘ ( 1, . . . , n) 2 [0, 1]n.
An outcome of the game is a pair (p, ) 2 (R+0 )2⇥ [0, 1]n formed by a pair of
prices p and a consumers choice  . The characterization of outcomes that
can arise in a market equilibrium will be done according to the notion of
subgame perfect equilibrium, hence by characterizing the Nash equilibria of
both stages.
3.1.1 Firms
The demand for each firm stems from the profiles of consumer choices that
maximize their utility, and it is therefore contained in the set of Nash equi-
librium of the consumers subgame. The equilibrium choices EC(p) of the
consumers subgame is the set of consumers choices   that are a Nash equi-
librium of the consumers subgame for a given pair of prices p from the
first stage. We say that an outcome (p, ) is credible if   2 EC(p). In
characterizing demand it is useful to use the partition of the set of individ-
uals for a given consumers choice   according to whether they use a pure
1Introducing a fixed cost structure does not change the results as it leads to an iso-
morphic set of equilibria through a change of parameters.
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strategy or a nondegenerate mixed strategy. Let us call loyal consumers to
those consumers who choose firm 1 or 2 with probability one, and non-loyal
consumers to those using a nondegenerate mixed strategy. The partition is
given by L1( ) [ L2( ) [M( ), where L1( ) ⌘ {i 2 I :  i1 = 1} and
L2( ) ⌘ {i 2 I :  i2 = 1} are the sets of consumers respectively loyal to each
firm and M( ) ⌘ {i 2 I : 0 <  i1 < 1} is the subset of non-loyal consumers
(those that play with non-integer probabilities). The cardinalities are respec-
tively denoted by l1( ) ⌘ #L1( ), l2( ) ⌘ #L2( ), and m( ) ⌘ #M( ).
Note that l1( ) + l2( ) +m( ) = n. We call (l1, l2) the loyalty characteri-
zation of the outcome (p, ), omitting the dependence when it is clear what
outcome we are refereing to. The demand for each firm is, respectively, given
by
D1( ) ⌘ l1( ) +
X
i2M( )
 i, D2( ) ⌘ l2( ) +
X
i2M( )
(1   i).
Note that, as the choice is mandatory it always leads to full market coverage
D1( )+D2( ) = n. The profit function ⇧ : (R+0 )2⇥ [0, 1]n ! R2 determines
the profit of each firm, respectively, given by
⇧1(p1, ) = p1D1( ), ⇧2(p2, ) = p2D2( ).
Local deviation beliefs. For the characterization of price equilibria it is
necessary to understand the dependence of consumer behavior on prices. In
particular, to figure out if a given price is a best response, each firm needs
to know how consumers would react to a price change. In this regard, we
consider that firms have local deviation beliefs: given an outcome (p⇤, ⇤)
and a neighbourhood P1(p⇤1) ⇥ P2(p⇤2) ⇢ (R+0 )2 of the outcome prices p⇤ =
(p⇤1, p⇤2), local deviation beliefs are maps  1 : P1 ! EC(P1, p⇤2) and  2 :
P2 ! EC(p⇤1, P2) that represent how firms believe consumers will respond
to small price deviations. That is, firm 1 believes that a deviation from
charging price p⇤1 to charging price p 2 P1 will lead consumers to respond
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with a change from the given consumer choice  ⇤ to a consumer choice
 1(p) 2 EC(p, p⇤2), producing demand D1( 1(p)). Analogously for  2, the
deviation belief of firm 2. By definition  1(p⇤1) =  2(p⇤2) =  ⇤.2 As deviation
beliefs are a way for firms to evaluate if a deviation is profitable, and we will
define market equilibrium through the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium,
it is natural that we have restricted beliefs to credible outcomes. We say
that a local deviation belief   preserves loyalty if we have L1( ) = L1( ⇤)
and L2( ) = L2( ⇤); and we say that firms have a common local belief if
 1(p⇤1 + ") =  2(p⇤2   "). The profit expected from a small price deviation,
taking into account local deviation beliefs, is ⇧⇤1(p1, 1) = p1D1( 1(p1)) for
firm 1, and ⇧⇤2(p2, 2) = p2D2( 2(p2)) for firm 2.
3.1.2 Consumers
Given an outcome (p, ) the payoﬀ of a consumer is built on the utility
derived from the use of each service which depends on three components:
(i) the price of each service; (ii) the personal benefit derived from the use of
each service; and (iii) the externality arising from the social influence exerted
at each service by the choice of the other consumers. We assume that the
utility has the PSS property and that the personal and social components
are commensurable with money. Therefore, we can characterize the payoﬀ
a consumer i derives from the use of a service s through: (i) the personal
component !(i; s) =  ps + bis, which is additively separable in price and
personal benefit bi : S ! R; and (ii) the social component measured by a
social externality function ei : S⇥ [0, 1](n 1) ! R. With this, the use of each
service respectively induces the following payoﬀs
ui1(p1;  i) =  p1 + bi1 + ei1 (  i) , ui2(p2;  i) =  p2 + bi2 + ei2 (  i) .
2This is not entirely a new concept, just a reinterpretation of mixed strategy in the
context of multistage games (see for example [34] p103). In our case we only want the
local part of deviation beliefs.
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The utility function u : I ⇥ (R+0 )2 ⇥ [0, 1]n ! R is given by
ui(p, ) =  i1u
i
1(p1;  i) +  
i
2u
i
2(p2;  i).
Product diﬀerentiation and types. The form of duopoly in considera-
tion and consequent results are naturally heavily dependent on the choice of
the consumers utility function, since the relation between the personal and
social parameters, and prices, will determine the Nash equilibria of the con-
sumers subgame, and ultimately market equilibria. Nevertheless, whether
a consumers choice is a Nash equilibrium or not is invariant to changes of
parameters that do not aﬀect the utility diﬀerentials  ui = ui1   ui2. Con-
sequently, the characterization of equilibria can be done up to isomorphism
through the diﬀerentials induced by  u, namely, the price diﬀerential
 p ⌘ p1   p2, (price diﬀerence).
and the diﬀerentials of personal benefit and social externalities, which char-
acterize product diﬀerentiation and are given by
 bi ⌘ bi1   bi2 (standard product diﬀerentiation);
 ei(  i) ⌘ ei1(  i)  ei2(  i) (social product diﬀerentiation).
Observe that while standard product diﬀerentiation is ‘intrinsic’ to a con-
sumer, social product diﬀerentiation has a contextual nature, in the sense of
representing how consumers diﬀerentiate the product taking into account its
momentaneous consumption profile.
Recall the type profile characterization of individuals in the beggining
of chapter 1. A consumers type is defined by three characteristics: (i) her
crowding type ci; (ii) her social externality function ei; and (iii) her personal
benefit function bi. This is given by a type3 map t : I ! C ⇥ E ⇥ B and
defines the type profile of consumers given by the triplet t = (c, e,b) in the
3The type of an individual is something known a priori, not a bayesian type.
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space T = (C ⇥ E ⇥ B)n, where c ⌘ (c1, . . . , cn) is the crowding profile of
individuals; e ⌘ (e1, . . . , en) is the externality profile; and b ⌘ (b1, . . . , bn) is
the valuation profile. Note that the pair (ei, bi) is what is usually called an
individual’s taste type, and the pair (e,b) determines the consumers product
diﬀerentiation profile.
Local influence network. An advantage of separating the taste into
two components is that the pairs (ci, ei) are responsible for the ‘social’ part
of the model, and we refer to this pair as the social type of individuals. The
personal benefit each consumer, or type, derives from her choice may be an-
alyzed separately from social interactions. The profile pair (c, e) captures
the social interactions in the model and is called the social profile. Based
on the social profile we can build a local network of influences that reveals
how small changes in the consumers strategy change social diﬀerentiation,
and thus payoﬀs. Note however that for loyal consumers this may not result
in a strategy change. When the best-reply contains a pure strategy and the
Nash equilibrium condition is strict, a change needs to be suﬃciently high to
result in a change of their best response. When the best-reply is constant in
the neighborhood of the outcome (p, ) , i.e. bri(p,  i + ") = bri(p,  i)
for some " > 0, we say that loyal consumers have lower sensitivity. The cru-
cial aspect to capture local changes in demand is the non-loyal consumers
strategy. Let us define the network: the nodes are non-loyal consumers and
the edges represent the influence two consumers have on eachother, which is
captured by the partial derivatives (@ ei/@ j)( ) (which are well defined for
interior points of non-loyal consumer strategies). The network is thus defined
by the non-loyal Jacobian matrix J e( ;M) ⌘
⇥
(@ ei/@ j)( ), i, j 2M⇤.
Note that the network is directed, weighted and state-dependent. Hence,
consumers may have diferent influence on eachother, and that influence need
not be symmetric nor have the same value throughout the network. Further-
more, it is state-dependent in the sense that the weight will depend on the
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consumers choice.
3.1.3 Social propensity and communities
For a matrix M let M (i) denote the matrix obtained by replacing column i
with 1 (from Cramer’s rule).
Definition 5 (Social propensity index). The social propensity index  of a
consumers choice   with det [J e( ;M)] 6= 0, is defined as
( ) ⌘
P
i det
h
J (i) e( ;M)
i
det [J e( ;M)] .
The local influence network and the associated index of social propensity
can be compactely represented and studied using invariances in the type
profile.
Definition 6 (Community). Given a strategy profile  , a community is a
subset of individuals Q ✓ I of a same social type (c, e) that choose the same
strategy q 2 [0, 1]. That is, Q ⌘ {i 2 I : (ci, ei) = (c, e) ^  i = q}.
A strategy profile induces a partition of the set of individuals into commu-
nitiesQ( , c, e) ⌘ {Q1, . . . , QnQ}. In particular there are loyal and non-loyal
communities. The advantage of communities is that strategy profiles that
induce the same community partitions produce the same social externalities.
Individuals within communities are not socially distinguishable so they in-
still the same externality to others, and they incur the same externality from
others.4 Thus, this induces an equivalence relation on the space of strategy
profiles and the network needs only to be built on top of communities.
Given a comunity partition Q( , c, e), let m ⌘ (m1, . . . ,mnQ) denote
the number of individuals in each community and let q ⌘ (q1, . . . , qnQ) be
the respective probabilities associated to each community. The communities
4The idea for the designation communities comes from the definition of societies in
[52].
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externality profile is given by f : Q⇥({0, . . . , n}⇥[0, 1])nQ ! R, and for every
individual i 2 Q,  ei(  i) = fQ(m,q) which characterizes social product
diﬀerentiation and the influence provoked by other communities. Note that
this is just a reduction of the space needed to characterize social interactions,
and not an imposition of any form. Consider a strategy profile   and let
Qi and Qj be two communities. The influence between the communities is
Aij(m,q) ⌘ (@fQi/@qj)(m,q). Note that for i 2 Qi and j 2 Qj we have
Aij(m,q) = (@ ei/@ j)( ). Let us define the community influence matrix
A(m,q) ⌘
0BBBBBBB@
A11(m,q)
m1 1
m1
A12(m,q) · · · A1nQ(m,q)
A21(m,q) A22(m,q)
m2 1
m2
· · · A2nQ(m,q)
... . . .
...
A2nQ(m,q) · · · · · · AnQnQ(m,q)
mnQ 1
mnQ
1CCCCCCCA .
In figure 3.1 is a depiction of the relation between two communities in a
community influence network.
Proposition 2 (Community social propensity index). Let det [A(m,q)] 6= 0.
The social propensity index  of a consumers choice   is determined by
communities
( ) = (m,q) ⌘
P
i det
⇥
A(i)(m,q)
⇤
det [A(m,q)]
.
The proof is left for the end of the next section. Social propensity is
a measure of how changes are captured by the social component of a mar-
ket. The interpretation is that it reveals how consumers may change their
strategy in response to local changes in the overall consumer profile. When
 > 0 changes in demand are amplified by social diﬀerentiation (similar to a
conformity, herd or bandwagon eﬀect). When  < 0 changes in demand are
mitigated by social diﬀerentiation (similar to a congestion, snob or Veblen
eﬀect). Hence, the response of demand to prices is amplified or mitigated
by social diﬀerentiation, acording to the social propensity of non-loyal con-
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Figure 3.1: Depiction of the influence relation between Two communities Q1
and Q2.
sumers. We are interested in duopolies with some social propensity.
Socially prone duopolies. We say that a duopoly is socially prone if there
is a non-empty set of consumer choices Sp ⇢ [0, 1]n with the following prop-
erties: for every   2 Sp
(i) Loyal communities have lower sensitivity;
(ii) Non-loyal communities are socially prone: (m,q) 6= 0.
Socially prone outcomes are non-monopolistic. Property (i) means that
in a neighborhood of the outcome the best-reply of a loyal individual is
constant, i.e. for i 2 L( ), bri(p + ",  i +  ) = bri(p,  i). Furthermore,
by the results of the first chapter, there is an open set of personal preferences
b such that (i) holds. The set of consumer choices such that (ii) holds is
dense in [0, 1]n. So Sp is a well behaved set, and in general Sp 6= ;.
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There are some natural restricions that non-zero social propensity im-
poses on the network of non-loyal consumers. Namely, the strong components
of the network cannot be singletons, i.e. there are no sinks or sources. The
idea that loyal consumers may have lower sensibility and not contribute to
social propensity is rather natural, and intuitive to the very notion of brand
loyalty. Note however that loyalty diﬀers from installed base, since being
loyal is a strategical behavior (those who opt for pure strategies) and not an
exogeneously imposed choice, or a choice deriving from some switch cost or
other stabilizing variable. In figure 3.2 is an example of a small local influence
network with two strong components and negative social propensity. A red
(green) conection represents a negative (positive) influence weight. Thick-
ness indicates relative strength of influence weights. The color of vertices
indicates the consumer strategy in a grey scale, where black means  i = 1,
and white means  i = 0.
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Figure 3.2: A small influence network with two strong components, posi-
tive and negative influences, and negative social propensity. A red (green)
conection represents a negative (positive) influence weight. Thickness indi-
cates relative strength of influence weights. The color of vertices indicates
the consumer strategy in a grey scale, where black means  i = 1, and white
means  i = 0.
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3.2 Local Market Equilibria
An outcome (p⇤, ⇤) with associated local deviation beliefs  1, 2 forms a
local market equilibrium if it is a subgame-perfect equilibrium for an open
set containg p⇤, that is, if  ⇤ 2 EC(p⇤) and p⇤ is a local Nash equilibrium
for the firms subgame taking into account their deviation beliefs. More
formally, the prices p⇤ are a local pure price equilibrium for firms if there is a
neighbourhood P1⇥P2 of prices, in which, for j = 1, 2, and for all pj 2 Pj(p⇤j ),
we have ⇧j(pj , j)  ⇧j(p⇤j , ⇤). Although we are using standard definitions,
let us define local market equilibrium formally to emphasize the notion that
it is local in prices and subgame-perfect.
Definition 7 (Local market equilibrium). An outcome (p, ) with local devi-
ation beliefs  1, 2 is a local market equilibrium if (i)   is a Nash equilibrium
of the consumers subgame, i.e.   2 EC(p); and (ii) p is a local pure price
equilibrium for the firms subgame.
Recall that both demand and beliefs must come from strategies contained
in the Nash equilibria of the consumers subgame, hence as price is the unique
strategic variable for firms, the characterization of local market equilibrium
is essentially dependent on the local structure of EC(p). Namely, through
the characterization of admissable local deviation beliefs, which rely on the
existence or non-existence of multiple equilibria, the relation between loyal
and non-loyal consumers and the price regions where they hold.
Main result
Suppose there is no product diﬀerentiation, meaning that  bi = 0 and
 ei = 0 for all i 2 I. The game becomes essencially the original Bertrand
framework. The paradox arises since EC(p) is a singleton except when
 p = 0, which induces the following unique demand beliefs: D1( ⇤1) = n
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if  p < 0; D1( ⇤1) = 0 if  p > 0. 5 This means the only credible non-
monopolistic outcomes have associated discontinuous beliefs, which leads to
the paradox. Since I is finite, introducing standard product diﬀerentiation
 bi 6= 0 for some subset of consumers I ✓ I, but no social diﬀerentiation
 ei = 0, for all i 2 I, may lead to a shift to a monopoly equilibrium, but the
behavior of consumers is identical. The set EC(p) still a singleton except for
a finite set of prices where  p =  bi for at least some consumer i 2 I. For
all other prices, consumers best response is unique and consumers will use
pure strategies, which will again lead to beliefs that are either discontinuous
or constant in a neighbourhood of the outcomes candidate for equilibria,
thus creating an incentive for firms to deviate. The introduction of a social
component will give rise to conected price regions where, not only are there
multiple Nash equilibria for the consumers subgame, but these include non-
degenerate mixed strategy equilibria with larger domains. This means there
are price regions where the loyalty characterization is constant and small
price changes may be captured by non-loyal consumers, leading to smooth
changes in demand. Nevertheless, although EC(p) is no longer a singleton
almost everywhere, if beliefs are contained in the pure strategy choices of
consumers, a market equilibrium where both firms have positive profits will
still fail to exist.
Lemma 6. If firms beliefs are that consumers use only pure strategies, or
use pure strategies for almost every price, i.e. M( ) = ; a.s., then in a
market equilibrium at least one firm has zero profit.
Naturally, an equilibrium may not exist, but for any outcome, a deviation,
if admissable, is profitable for firms. When we allow consumers to use mixed
strategies, the eﬀect of a price deviation may be captured by smooth changes
in the non-loyal consumers probability through the externality function. The
5There are multiple equilibria only when  p = 0, and in fact as any choice is a Nash
equilibrium of the consumers subgame EC(p, p) = [0, 1]n.
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properties of the externality function will be inherited by demand and allow
the existence of continuous deviation beliefs that stabilize prices and create
market equilibria where both firms earn positive profits. The drawback with
these new equilibria for consumers is the coordination problem posed by
the multiplicity of Nash equilibria of the consumers subgame. In particular,
firms will face a coordination problem, since local deviation beliefs are in
general not unique.
Lemma 7 (Demand responsiveness). Consider a socially prone duopoly and
a credible outcome (p⇤, ⇤) with a socially prone consumer choice  ⇤ 2 Sp.
There is a unique continuous local deviation belief  ⇤. Furthermore, this
belief preserves loyalty, is common for both firms, and in equilibrium
@Ds
@ps
( ⇤(p)) = ( ⇤), s 2 S.
Although discontinuous beliefs are credible alternatives, since they are
contained in the set of Nash equilibria of the consumers subgame, they are
hard to justify from an economic perspective. It’s hard to envision a situation
where firms will believe that small price deviations provoke a disruptive
behavior in consumers, when there is a credible smooth alternative. The
second part of lemma 7 shows why outcomes with positive social propensity
will in general not allow for equilibria with positive profits, while negative
social propensity will create the eﬀect of slowing the demand response to
price changes, opening the possibility of a shared market equilibrium. When
social propensity tends to infinity it leads towards jumps, meaning consumers
will be highly sensitive to changes, which may prevent firms from finding
an equilibrium. On the other hand if social propensity gets close to zero,
consumers will have low sensitivity to changes, which leads to the opposite
eﬀect, also preventing firms from finding non-monopolistic equilibria.
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Theorem 9 (Local Market Equilibrium). Consider a socially prone duopoly
and let   2 Sp. The outcome (p, ) is a local market equilibrium with
continuous deviation beliefs and positive profits for both firms if, and only if,
( ) < 0, prices are given by
p1 =   l1 +m · q
(m,q)
p2 =   l2 +m · (1  q)
(m,q)
and personal preferences for non-loyal communities are
 bQ =
l2   l1 +m · (1  2q)
(m,q)
  fQ(m,q).
Furthermore, there is a unique continuous local deviation belief, which is
common for both firms and preserves communities.
Note that if   2 Sp then 0 < D1( ), D2( ) < n. The theorem, which is
the main result of this chapter, not only proves the existence of local market
equilibria with shared demand and positive profits, but also characterizes
completely its prices and reveals consumer personal preferences. The condi-
tions are rather general and rely exclusively on the properties of the social
profile through the social propensity index. Socially prone duopolies thus
disrupt the Bertrand paradox and provide pure price solutions These solu-
tions do not rely on heterogeneity to exist or to be asymmetrical. Note that
this work focuses on local equilibria, so in order to obtain a global solution,
one would need to discuss firms beliefs farther away from the local behavior
of consumers. In these cases, firms need not coordinate on the same belief.
In figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are three ilustrative examples of local influence
networks and the respective values of a local market equilibrium. In figure 3.3
an influence network with 40 consumers and respective social propensity and
equilibrium values. In figure 3.4 is the reduced community network of figure
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3.3. Note that the values are exactly the same. The size of the vertices
represent the size of communities. A red (green) conection represents a
negative (positive) influence weight. Thickness indicates relative strength
of influence weights. The color of vertices indicates the consumer strategy
in a grey scale, where black means  i = 1, and white means  i = 0. In
figure 3.5 is an example of an network comprised only of positive interactios,
but that, nonetheless, produces a shared equilibrium due to a high negative
social propensity, which drives price close to zero.
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Figure 3.3: A influence network with 40 individuals and the respective social
propensity and local market equilibrium. It’s nearly impossible to uncover
relations in such a condensed set of relations, nevertheless this can be dealt
with using communities, as can be seen in figure 3.4. A red (green) conection
represents a negative (positive) influence weight. Thickness indicates relative
strength of influence weights. The color of vertices indicates the consumer
strategy in a grey scale, where black means  i = 1, and white means  i = 0.
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Figure 3.4: The community network for the individuals influence network in
figure 3.3. The size of the vertices indicates the communities size, which in
this case are respectively 8, 12, 6, 14. The color of the vertices indicates the
community strategy in a grey scale, where black means  i = 1, and white
means  i = 0. Again, a red (green) conection represents a negative (positive)
influence weight. Thickness indicates relative strength of influence weights.
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Figure 3.5: A influence network where there are only positive interactions
but still a high negative social propensity.
Proofs
Lemma 6
Proof. Suppose by reductio ad absurdum there is an equilibrium where both
firms charge positive profits. As demand is almost surely based on pure
strategies and the game is finite, there is " > 0, as small as desired, such
that demand for p⇤1 ± " is either constant or a jump. In both cases there is
an incentive to deviate.
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Lemma 7
Proof. Recall that  ui(p, ) =  bi    p +  ei(  i). Since   is a Nash
equilibrium for consumers and   2 Sp (loyals have lower sensitive), we must
have the following,
(i)  ui(p, ) > 0 for i 2 L1( )
(ii)  ui(p, ) < 0 for i 2 L2( )
(iii)  ui(p, ) = 0 for i 2M( )
Hence for i 2 L( ) the best response is constant in a neighbourhood Vp( ).
Let m = #M( ) (number of mixed players), with m > 1. Index the players
in the set M( ) ⌘ {1, . . . ,m}. Consider the function
 U : (R+0 )2 ⇥ (0, 1)m ! Rm
(p, ) 7!  u1(p, ), . . . , um(p, )
Let (p⇤, ⇤) be an outcome in the conditions of theorem. By (iii), and the
fact that for loyals the best response is locally constant, any outcome in the
neighbourhood of (p⇤, ⇤) such that  U(p, ) = 0 is a Nash equilibrium for
consumers. Note now that  U is C1 and recall that
J e( ) ⌘
⇥
(@ ei/@ j)( ), i, j 2M( )⇤ ,
Observe that the jacobian determinant for  U is
det [J  U(p
⇤, ⇤)] = det [J e( ⇤)] 6= 0 (by assumption).
Therefore, using the Implicit Function Theorem, there exists an open set
Vp ⇥ V  ⇢ (R+0 )2 ⇥ (0, 1)m and a unique C1 function   : Vp ! V  such that
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 U(p, (p)) = 0. Furthermore, in that neighbourhood
X
i
@ U
@ i(p)
(p, (p))
@ i
@p1
(p) =
@ U
@p1
(p, (p))
Recall now that  ui(p, ) =  bi  p+ ei(  i). Hence in the neighbour-
hood,  ei(  i) =  p  bi, and
J e( (p))
@ 
@p1
(p) = 1m
Using Cramer rule
@ i
@p1
(p) =
det
h
J (i) e( (p))
i
det [J e( (p))]
where J (i) e( (p)) is obtained by replacing column i with 1 in J e( 
⇤). As
such in that neighbourhood
@D1
@p1
( (p)) =
P
i det
h
J (i) e( (p))
i
det [J e( (p))]
Theorem 9
Proof. The isoprofit functions for outcomes (p⇤, ⇤), where p1, p2 6= 0 are
given, respectively, by
h1(p1;p
⇤, ⇤) =
p⇤1D1( ⇤)
p1
, h2(p2;p
⇤, ⇤) =
p⇤2(n D1( ⇤))
p2
.
which we abreviate to h1(p1) and h2(p2) when there is no ambiguity to which
outcome we are refreing to. The isoprofit for firm 1 results from solving the
following equality (p⇤1 +  )h1(p⇤1 +  ) = p⇤1D1( ⇤) (and analogously for firm
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2). The derivatives are
h01(p1) =  
p⇤1D1( ⇤)
p21
, h02(p2) =  
p⇤2(n D1( ⇤))
p22
(3.1)
For an outcome to be a market equilibrium, it must satisfy the following
conditions:
(i) @D1( 
⇤)
@p1
= h01(p⇤1);
(ii) @D2( 
⇤)
@p2
= h02(p⇤2);
(iii) h01(p⇤1) = h02(p⇤2);
(iv) D1( 1(p1, p⇤2))  h1(p1);
(v) D2( 2(p⇤1, p2))  h2(p2).
Furthermore, since D1 +D2 = n, we have that
@D2( ⇤)
@p2
=  @D1( 
⇤)
@p2
.
From (iii), (iv) and 3.1 we get
p⇤1 =  
D1( ⇤)
@D1( ⇤)
@p1
; p⇤2 =
n D1( ⇤)
@D1( ⇤)
@p2
.
Now observe that by lemma 7 this characterizes prices. To conclude the
proof observe that  bi =  p  ei(  i).
Proposition 2 (page 78)
Proof. Note that by lemma 7, the social propensity index is the unique so-
lution to a system.
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3.3 Underlying network structure and homogeneities
The influence network allows the characterization of symmetries, and thus
heterogeneity, based on the social type (ci, ei) of individuals. There are two
main lines in analyzing the impact of social heterogeneity of a consumers
social profile: (i) the underlying structure of the influence network, meaning
the unweighted digraph (directed graph); and (ii) the distribution of weights
in the network. In this section we analyze how social propensity will rely on
the structural properties of the underlying network when there are strong
symmetries (or homogeneities) on the influence weights. This will allow so-
cial propensity to be seen as a functional. For any given underlying network,
with the appropriate choice of weights, the index can attain any value, ei-
ther positive or negative. The idea works vice-versa, in terms of weights and
underlying network.
Let G ⌘ G(c, e) be the underlying unweighted network of consumer
interactions. Let det [G] be the determinant of the correspondent adjacency
matrix and det [Gij ] be determinant of its ij minor. Let det[G(i)] be, as
before, obtained from det[G] by replacing entries in column i by 1.
When the crowding space C is a singleton, there is crowding anonymity.
This means individuals do not distinguish between one another and they are
influenced by every individual equally. Nevertheless, diﬀerent individuals
might be influenced diﬀerently. In terms of the influence network it implies
that for every individual i 2 I
@ ei/@ j1 = @ ei/@ j2 , 8j1, j2 2 I.
Let ✓i( ) ⌘ @ ei/@ j be the weight for individual i associated to the change
of other individual j (the crowding homogeneous weight). Note that the
influence matrix has an horizontal symmetry, as all individuals influence i
by the same amount ✓i.
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Proposition 3 (Crowding anonymity). Given a social profile with crowding
anonimity, the social propensity index is given by
ca( ) =
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j det [Gij ] /✓i( )
det [G]
.
Example 3 (Aggregated externality). The simplest form of externality with
crowding anonimity is probably when social influence is exerted through the
aggregate choice of other consumers, thus, when the externality is derived
from a function which looks only at the aggregate behavior. In that case, social
diﬀerentiation can be measured through an aggregated externality function
gi : S ⇥ [0, n   1] ! R. The social diﬀerentiation in this case becomes
 ei(  i) = gi (D i) where D i ⌘
P
j 6=i  
j.
The same reasoning as the one presented in propostion 3 can be done with
a vertical symmetry on the influence network matrix. In fact just replace i by
j in the above expression. This is an interesting homogeneity property, since
it means that every individual, in that strategy context, is being influenced
in the same ‘way’, that is
@ ei1/@ j = @ ei2/@ j , 8i1, i2, j 2 I.
Nevertheless, this does not have a counterpart on the externality types of
individuals, as it does with an horizontal symmetry and the crowding type.
This is essencially due to the fact that the same externality type need not
induce type symmetric strategies. The crowding type, however, is defined
‘outside’ the utility function. We define this as a social diﬀerentiation ho-
mogeneity. Let ✓j( ) ⌘ @ ei/@ j .
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Proposition 4 (Social diﬀerentiation homogeneity). Given a social profile
with social diﬀerentiation homogeneity, the social propensity index is
eh( ) =
P
i det
⇥
G(i)
⇤
/✓i( )
det [G]
.
Although from the point of view of firms both horizontal and vertical
symmetries appear as very similar, from a consumers best response point of
view, they are quite distinct. In fact the following result does not hold for
crowding anonimity.
Lemma 8 (Complete network with social diﬀerentiation homogeneity). When
the network is complete and there is homogeneity of social diﬀerentiation, the
social propensity index is
eh( ) =
P
i(✓i)
 1
m  1 .
Let’s go back to the aggregated example, and assume all individuals have
the same externality type, hence, they all look at the aggregate through
the same aggregated externality function g : S ⇥ [0, n   1] ! R. Social
diﬀerentiation becomes
 ei(  i) = g (D i) .
Note that whilst the function is common, each consumer may be applying it
in diﬀerent points according to the aggregate they face, which, in this finite
case, need not be the same. The next theorem shows how social propensity
still depends on the individual i.
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Theorem 10 (Aggregated externality). In a socially prone duopoly with
socially homogeneous consumers and a C1 aggregated externality function g,
the social propensity index for   2 Sp is
g( ) =
1
m  1
X
i
(1/g0(D i)).
This does not exclude that when there is total symmetry (both horizontal
and vertical) the social propensity index will rely essencially on the properties
of the underlying network.
Proposition 5 (Total weight symmetry). When the influence matrix has all
entries with the same weight ✓( ), then  relies essencially on the properties
of the underlying network, and is given by
ts( ) =  
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j det [Gij ]
det [G] ✓( )
.
Example 4. In the complete network case, total weight symmetry leads to
ts( ) =
m
(m  1)✓( ) .
Observe however that in the case of a total symmetry, although individ-
uals all have the same social type, and are thus socially homogeneous, this
does not mean they derive the same personal benefit from the use of each
service, i.e. there may be i, j with  bi 6=  bj .
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Proofs
Proposition 3
Proof. Observe that every non-zero entry of every column has the same
value, ✓i, except for the columns on the numerator, whose entries have been
replaced by 1.
ca( ) =
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j
Q
i 6=j ✓
i( ) det [Gij ]Q
i ✓
i( ) det [G]
,
which can be rewritten
ca( ) =
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j
Q
i ✓
i( )/✓j( ) det [Gij ]Q
i ✓
i( ) det [G]
,
and
ca( ) =
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j det [Gij ] /✓j( )
det [G]
.
Proposition 5
Proof. Observe that every non-zero entry has the same value, ✓ ⌘ ✓( ),
except for the columns on the numerator whose entries have been replaced
by 1.
ts( ) =
P
i ✓
m 1 det
⇥
G(i)
⇤
✓m det [G]
,
which can be rewritten
ts( ) =
P
i
P
j( 1)i+j det [Gij ]
✓ det [G]
.
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Lemma 8
Proof. For a complete graph Gm with m vertices, we have that det(G) =
( 1)m 1(m   1). Observe now that G(i) just adds 1 in entry ii, and the
minor Gii is a replica of the complete graph with one less vertex. Thus,
det(G(i)) = det(Gm) + det(Gm 1) = ( 1)m 1(m  1) + ( 1)m 2(m  2),
which equates to
det(G(i)) = ( 1)m 1(m  1 m  1 + 1) = ( 1)m 1.
The proof of the lemma follows from direct aplication of the above result in
the following expression
eh( ) =
P
i det
⇥
G(i)
⇤
/✓i
det [G]
.
which is
eh( ) =
P
i(✓i)
 1
m  1 .
Theorem 10
The proof of the theorem follows straightforward from Lemma 8 by con-
structing the influence matrix and showing it has social diﬀerentiation ho-
mogeneity, which follows directly from social homogeneity. Nevertheless we
leave an alternative proof based on the implicit function theorem.6
6The reason we leave the proof is because it was the starting proof of this work, later
generalized for higher dimensions and heterogeneity in the main theorem. With the use
of the determinant of a complete graph it becomes trivial.
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Proof. Consider  u : (0,+1)2 ⇥ (0, n  1)! R, which is given by
 u(p, D i) =  b  p+ g(D i),
(Observe that  u is C1 and defined on an open set which excludes prices
equal to zero and imposes that at least one player diﬀerent from i is playing
in non-integer probability.)
Note that @ u@D i = g
0(D i). If there is a point (p⇤, d⇤) 2 (0,+1)2⇥ (0, n 1)
such that  u(p⇤, d⇤) = 0 and g0(d⇤) 6= 0, then (by the IFT) there are a
ball B(p⇤,  ) 2 (0,+1)2 and an interval J = (d⇤   ", d⇤ + ") such that
 u 1(0) \ (B ⇥ J) is the graphic of a function yi : B ! J of class C1. For
all p 2 B we have
@yi
@ps
(p) =  @ u
@ps
(p, yi(p))/
@ u
@D i
(p, yi(p)), s = 1, 2
as
@ u
@ps
= ⌥1, thus,
@yi
@ps
(p) = ±1/g0(yi(p)), s = 1, 2
hence D i = yi(p) is defined implicitly by  u(p, D i) = 0 and for every
p 2 B there is a unique D i = yi(p) 2 J such that  u(p, D i) = 0.
For an equilibrium with m players using nondegenerate mixed strategies,
provided above is, for every i 2M( ), the solution to the system
X
j 6=i
 j = yi(p)  l1
with 0 <  i, j < 1 and 0 < yi(p) yj(p) < 1 hence the equilibrium demand
is
D1( ) =
P
i yi(p) ml1
m  1
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and
@D1(p)
@p1
=
1
m  1
X
i
(1/g0(D i)).
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3.4 Dyadic interactions
In this section we study the case of a social externality function based on
dyadic interactions, i.e. we assume the utility function has the DI property.
By proposition 1 the utility function u : I ⇥ (R+0 )2 ⇥ [0, 1]n ! R is given by
the weighted combination of the following pure strategy payoﬀs
ui1(p1;  i) =  p1+bi1+
X
j
↵ij1  
j , ui2(p2;  i) =  p2+bi2+
X
j
↵ij2 (1  j).
The externality function is thus additively separable, which means the entries
in the influence matrix, that is the partial derivatives, depend only on every
pair of players. Social diﬀerentiation becomes
 ei (  i) =
X
j
(↵ij2 + ↵
ij
1 ) 
j  
X
j
↵ij2
The influence network is locally constant and given by the following coordi-
nates
(@ ei/@ j)( ) = ↵ij1 + ↵
ij
2 .
In the case of dyadic interactions, it is particular useful to study the sym-
metries imposed by the type profile.
Proposition 6. In a duopoly with dyadic interactions, if the MTS condition
holds for all types, each type has at most one non-loyal community.
Proof. Recall that by corollary 6, if the mixed type-symmetric condition
(MTS) holds for some type t 2 T , then all individuals of type t must be
using the same strategy at a Nash equilibrium.
The community influence matrix does not depend on the probability
chosen in the strategy, namely, for types t, t0, we can define Att0 ⌘ ↵tt01 +↵tt02 .
The MTS in this case is Att 6= 0, and the type influence is given by the
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matrix
A(m) ⌘
0BBBBBB@
A11
m1 1
m1
A12 · · · A1nT
A21 A22
m2 1
m2
· · · A2nQ
... . . .
...
A2nT · · · · · · AnQnT mnT 1mnT
1CCCCCCA .
In particular this means the socially propensity index is locally constant
↵(m) ⌘
P
i det
⇥
A(i)(m)
⇤
det [A(m)]
,
and equilibrium demand varies linearly with price,
D⇤1 = 
⇤
↵p
⇤
1.
Being locally constante, the influence network induces an invertible property
on the set of local market equilibria.
Theorem 11 (Revealing preferences). In a socially prone duopoly with dyadic
interactions the personal profile b and non-loyal characterization m fully de-
termine the local market equilibrium.
We note that by theorem 9 det[A(m)] 6= 0 is a necessary condition for
the existence of a local market equilibrium with both firms earning positive
profits. The equilibrium strategy for the consumers subgame is, in this case,
given by the type solution to a linear system. Furthermore, by theorem 11,
when det(A(m)) 6= 0 the system has a unique solution. When the personal
profile is such that the solution is in fact an interior point of a probability
distribution, that is all coordinates lie in the interval (0, 1), the equilibrium
will be a duopoly equilibrium with positive profits as given by socially prone
outcomes. As such, for every strategy class the loyal characterization (l1, l2)
and the type non-loyal characterization m completely determine the local
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solution to the duopoly problem given by theorem 9. Therefore, given a pro-
file of product diﬀerentiation (e,b) if firms have some previous information,
or some ideia on what loyalty characterization to expect, they know exactly
what are the local market equilibria. This is a rather reasonable assumption
for any market, especially if there areprevious consumption moments for the
services firms provide. Furthermore, this is the most natural interpretation
for a ‘loyal’ consumer.
However, from a game theoretic point of view, when the choice of a con-
sumer includes no previous information and must be made simultaneously
with all other consumers, a coordination problem on the loyal characteriza-
tion remains. Having multiplicity of equilibria and no coordination device,
in the moment of choosing a strategy, consumers are left with the question
of deciding which is the best strategy given that they don’t know what the
others will do. The following result provides a possible alternative solution
to that of previous information. Let AL(b) be the set of admissable loyal
characterizations under personal profile b.
Proposition 7 (Focal equilibrium). In a socially prone duopoly with dyadic
interactions, the following loyal characterization is a focal point for con-
sumers,
(i) if Att < 0 then (lt1, lt2) = (0, 0);
(ii) if Att > 0 then
(lt1, l
t
2) =
8>>><>>>:
(n, 0) if  bt   p > 0
(0, n) if  bt   p < 0
(0, 0) if  bt   p = 0
.
Furthermore, this equilibrium is fair for consumers and leads to a unique
focal market equilibrium.
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The notion of focal point is that of Schelling from [41], and is based
on the idea that without communication and in the presence of multiple
equilibria, players may coordinate in an equilibrium whose salience appears
as a unique possible coordination device. The notion of fair equilibrium, is
an equilibrium where individuals of the same type receive the same payoﬀ.
Establishing a focal equilibrium is always amenable to critiques, nevertheless
it is yet another way of completing theorem 11.
Proofs
Theorem 11
Recall that given a matrix H we denote by H(i) the matrix obtained from
matrix H by replacing column i by 1.
Claim 2. Let H be a n ⇥ n matrix and 1n the n ⇥ n matrix with 1 in all
entries. For any r 2 R,
det(H + r1n) = det(H) + r
X
i
det
⇣
H(i)
⌘
Proof. Let hˆi be column i of matrix H. Note that
det(H + r1n) = det(hˆ1 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ)
We start by separating the first column
det(H + r1n) = det(hˆ1, hˆ2 + r1ˆ . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ) + det(r1ˆ, hˆ2 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ)
Now observe that the second term det(r1ˆ, hˆ2 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ) leads to
det(r1ˆ, hˆ2, hˆ3 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ) + det(r1ˆ, r1ˆ, hˆ3 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ)
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and det(r1ˆ, r1ˆ, hˆ3 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ) = 0. Hence
det(r1ˆ, hˆ2 + r1ˆ, . . . , hˆn + r1ˆ) = det(r1ˆ, hˆ2, hˆ3, . . . , hˆn) = r det
⇣
H(1)
⌘
The reasoning continues for every column.
Proof. (of theorem 11) In equilibrium, by theorem 9 the following holds for
non-loyal consumers  bi =   D( )/( )  ei(  i). Note that  D( ) =
D2 D1 = n 2D1. Furthermore, with dyadic interactions, social propensity
is locally constant, i.e. ( ) = ↵(m), furthermore,
@D1
@ j
= 1 and
@ ei
@ j
=
Aij . We want to show that the following has a unique solution
@ bi
@ j
=  2/↵  Aij
Hence we want to show that det(J b( )) 6= 0 ( the jacobian for  b). Now
note that
det(J b( )) = det
✓
 A(m)  2
↵
1m
◆
By claim 2
det(J b( )) =   det(A(m))  2↵
X
i
det
⇣
A(i)(m)
⌘
but using the definition of ↵(m), we get (supposing
P
i det
 
A(i)(m)
  6= 0)
det(J b( )) =  3 det(A(m)),
and det(A(m)) 6= 0.
Proposition 7
Proof. Note that consumers of the same type are indistinguishable, so what-
ever is the reasoning behind trying to antecipate the behavior of other in-
dividuals, the conclusion must be the same. Hence, they would all end up
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in a type symmetric strategy, which is in fact the one where they all play a
mixed strategy, since, by corollary 6, if the mixed type-symmetric condition
(MTS) holds all individuals of type t must be using the same strategy at a
Nash equilibrium, which is precise. In the case of positive externalities, as
there are three type-symmetric strategies, they can in fact choose the one
they all prefer.
3.4.1 The case with DI and homogeneous consumers
In this subsection we take the example of homogeneous consumers. The
results are basicly aplications of all previous results and thus proofs are
omitted. The purpose is to give cleaner explicit analytical expressions for
prices and demand. Let the social externality function be formed by DI
and consider socially homogeneous consumers, i.e. all individuals i, j 2 I
have the same personal profile  bi =  bj =  b, and the same social profile
↵ij1 = ↵1 and ↵
ij
2 = ↵2. The influence network is complete and determined
by a single weight parameter ↵1 + ↵2. Let us suppose the MTS condition
holds, that is ↵1+↵2 6= 0. The mixed strategy equilibria, by corollary 7, are
given by some loyalty characterization (l1, l2) and a unique probability used
by non-loyal consumers. Let m = n   l1   l2 be the number of non-loyal
consumers, and qm the probability used by non-loyal consumers. Demand is
given by D1( ⇤) = l1+mqm. The social propensity index is thus completely
determined locally by ↵1 + ↵2 and m, and given by
↵(m) =
m
(m  1)(↵1 + ↵2) .
Remark 6 (Linear aggregate). Consider a linear aggregated externality func-
tion g1(d) = ↵1d and g2(d) = ↵2(n   d) where d 2 [0, n   1]. Then, the
consumers game amounts to this same game with homogeneous consumers
and dyadic interactions (which can be seen by theorem 10).
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When m > 0 let us define the consumers behavior loyalty indices, respec-
tively the market loyalty index L, and the (marginal) firms loyalty indices
L1, L2,
L( ) ⌘ l1 + l2
m
; L1( ) ⌘ l1
m
, L2( ) ⌘ l2
m
.
When m = 0 define L = n and analogously for L1, L2. Note that the loyalty
indices are in the range 0  L  n, n being full market loyalty. When L = 0,
there are only non-loyal players. Naturally, a shared market equilibrium only
exists if L < n.
Recall the decision threshold T (l1) ⌘  (↵1 + ↵2)l1 + ↵2(n  1).
Lemma 9 (Congestion eﬀects). Let ↵1 + ↵2 < 0. The admissible demand
for each (l1, l2) characterization is given by
D⇤1(p) = l1 +m
 b  p  T (l1)
 (↵2 + ↵1)(m  1)
Proof. Follows directly from corollary 7.
Theorem 12 (Congestion equilibrium prices). Let ↵1+↵2 < 0. The market
equilibrium prices for each loyalty characterization are given by
p⇤1 =  
1
3
(↵1 + ↵2) (n  L⇤   L⇤1   1) +
1
3
( b  ↵2(n  1)) ;
p⇤2 =
1
3
(↵1 + ↵2) (n  L⇤   L⇤2   1) 
1
3
( b+ ↵1(n  1)) .
Note that the price diﬀerence is
 p⇤ =
1
3
((↵1 + ↵2) L+ 2 b+ (n  1) ↵)
When the market grows, the main responsibles for price asymmetries are so-
cial product diﬀerentiation and changes in the market loyalty indices, which
are also proportional to the social weights. In particular, it would be natural
that a market grows and the loyalty indices are kept constant. The role of
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Figure 3.6: Equilbrium demand in a simplistic case of 6 consumers. Rep-
resented are the thresholds for pure strategies, and the mixed strategies in
red. Highlighted is a particular local pure price equilibrium.
standard product diﬀerentiation in creating price asymmetries is overcome.
Note that under congestion efects, heterogeneity is not necessary to resolve
the classical Bertrand paradox, nor to achieve asymmetric pure price equi-
libria. In figure 3.6 is depicted equilibrium demand for the case of congestion
eﬀects.
Lemma 10 (Conformity eﬀects). Let ↵1 + ↵2   0. The admissible demand
has only one discontinuity which is the equilibrium point, and it is continuous
out of equilibrium. It is of the form
D⇤1(p) =
8>>><>>>:
n if p1 < p2   c⇤b
nqm if p1 = p2   c⇤b
0 if p1 > p2   c⇤b
3.4. DYADIC INTERACTIONS 109
where c⇤b 2 [ ↵1(n  1),↵2(n  1)].
We call c⇤b the consumer bias parameter, as it indicates how consumers
will choose between two firms, when both monopolies are in their best re-
sponse. Note that in the case where ↵1 + ↵2   0 the strategy of consumers
is completely determined by the consumer bias parameter. When c⇤b = 0
we are in the Bertrand framework (consumers essentially ignore the multiple
‘possibilities created by externalities).
Theorem 13 (Conformity equilibria). Let ↵1 + ↵2   0. The market equi-
librium is
(i) a monopoly for firm 1 with price p = (|c⇤b |, 0) if c⇤b < 0;
(ii) a monopoly for firm 2 with price p = (0, c⇤b) if c
⇤
b > 0;
(iii) a Bertrand zero profit equilibrium with p = (0, 0) and demand D⇤1 2
{0, n/2, n} if c⇤b = 0.
Note that in the positve case the price diﬀerence is
 p⇤ = c⇤b .
In figure 3.7 is depicted equilibrium demand for the case of conformity eﬀects.
3.4.2 Pure strategies and monopolies
When consumers have biased personal preferences  b, i.e. they are con-
tained in pure type-symmetric Nash domains, firms have the possibility to
have monopoly, or at least type-monopolies, meaning all individuals of the
same type. Furthermore, the demand behavior results from the relative pref-
erences  bt   p induced by the pair of prices set by the firms in the first
stage, and must be based on a strategy whose Nash domain contains the rel-
ative preferences. On one hand, there is a limited set of relative preferences
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Figure 3.7: Equilbrium demand in the case of conformity eﬀects. Shad-
owed are the multiple equilibria not chosen in the admissble demand. The
consumer bias parameter c⇤b indicates the choice of consumers in the region
where the three type-symmetric equilibrium exist.
that can be induced by a pair of prices, namely, as  bt   p, we have that
for every pair of prices set by the firms, they will be in { b+m1nT }. On the
other hand, these preferences need to be resistent to price deviations, and
its neighbourhood must intersect the Nash domain of a diﬀerent strategy,
as the smallest price change must provoke a change in consumers behavior,
or else it would be profitable to deviate. A pair of prices p⇤ is part of a
subgame-perfect equilibria only if the relative preferences profile is in a sin-
gleton given by the intersection of  bt   p with the boundary of the pure
Nash domain. This is because in interior points demand is constant. We are
thus able to identify the price candidates to a firm equilibrium geometrically.
In the benchmark case, when there is no consumer network, there are
3.4. DYADIC INTERACTIONS 111
only pure strategies for individuals. The monopoly/competitive regions are
characterized by
M1 ⌘
⇢
 b 2 (R+)nT : 8t, t0 2 T , nt
n
  b
t0
 bt
 n
nt0
 
M2 ⌘
⇢
 b 2 (R )nT : 8t, t0 2 T , nt
n
   b
t0
 bt
  n
nt0
 
Z = {0}
Note that, in the previous homogeneous case, if A = 0 then M1 ⇢ (R+)nt ,
M2 ⇢ (R )nt and M1 \M2 = {0}.
The equilibium will be
(i) monopoly for firm 1 if b 2M1 ⇢ N (n, 0) with prices p = (min bt, 0);
(ii) monopoly for firm 2 if b 2M2 ⇢ N (0, n) with prices p = (0,min | bt|);
(iii) a equilibrium with zero profits if  b = 0, with p = 0;
(iv) no equilibrium if  b /2M1 [M2.
Before we set out for the geometric example, note that adding inter-type
interactions, while leaving intra-type at zero (Att = 0 )has the following
eﬀect on the monopoly regions.
M1 ⌘
⇢
 b 2 (R+)nT : 8t, t0 2 T , nt
n
  b
t0   ↵t0t1
 bt   ↵tt01
 n
nt0
 
M2 ⌘
⇢
 b 2 (R )nT : 8t, t0 2 T , nt
n
   b
t0   ↵t0t2
 bt   ↵tt02
  n
nt0
 
Z = ⇥tt0
h
min{ ↵tt01 ,↵tt
0
2 },max{ ↵tt
0
1 ,↵
tt0
2 }
i
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Figure 3.8: The benchmark case and monopoly areas. Note the Bertrand
paradoxical zero profit equilibrium is at the origin. A11 = A22 = A12 =
A21 = 0.
The case with two types of consumers ( 2,2)
Consider two types t1, t2 of consumers. The reduced influence network is de-
termined by the parameters A11, A12, A21, A22. The social propensity index
is
↵(m) =
A11(m1   1)/m1 +A22(m2   1)/m2  A12  A21
A11A22(m1   1)(m2   1)/m1m2  A12A21 .
In figures 3.13, 3.8, 3.12, 3.9, A.3, 3.11 and 3.14 are depicted the monopoly
regions and their relation with changes in the parameters of the social profile.
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Figure 3.9: The eﬀect of one positive intertype interactions. A12 > 0 and
A11 = A22 = A21 = 0. The monopoly regions intersect and there is a region
with zero profit equilibrium for both firms.
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Figure 3.10: The eﬀect of one negative intertype interactions. A12 < 0 and
A11 = A22 = A21 = 0. The monopoly regions get separated and there is a
region with no equilibrium.
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Figure 3.11: The eﬀect of intertype interactions with diﬀerent signs. A12 > 0,
A21 < 0 and A11 = A22 = 0. There is a region with no pure equilibrium for
consumers.
116 CHAPTER 3. SOCIALLY PRONE DUOPOLIES
Figure 3.12: The eﬀect of positive intertype or intratype interactions. Both
produce the same eﬀect. In the case A12 > 0, A21 > 0 and A11 = A22 = 0.
There is a region where there is multiplicity equilibria, and the lighter colored
areas of monopoly will only exist depending on the choice of consumers on the
areas where multiple equilibria exist. Furthermore, in the middle square the
consumer bias parameter will decide the position of the line corresponding
to the competitive equilibria.
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Figure 3.13: The eﬀect of negative intratype interactions. The shaded re-
gions around monopolies mean that the monopoly region will depend on
the consumers choice on the area of intersection, that has multiple Nash
equilibria. A12 < 0, A21 < 0 and A11 = A22 = 0.
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Figure 3.14: All parameters turned on. A12 > 0, A21 < 0 and A11 < 0,
A22 < 0. The shaded areas are contain the socially prone outcomes.
Chapter 4
Conclusions and future work
We have set forth an idea of how to build up market equilibria with pure
price strategies, and classify markets according to solutions based on an
index of the interdependence of social interactions in consumption, called
social propensity. This allows the departure from the paradoxical zero price
equilibrium and the characterization of prices, demand and personal prefer-
ences using social propensity. Naturally, further study of the properties of
the index, the dependence on particular parameters of a market, the study
of what happens when the market changes, namely when it grows, or how
it behaves for particular types of networks and canonical network examples,
besides the complete network, should be develpped. Namely, for special con-
figurations like small-world networks. In particular, an econometric analysis
on real market data would be an interesting source of validation or refu-
tation, and it could provide insights on whether to adjust the definition or
create diﬀerent indices. In this regard, the reduction of the influence network
to communities appears as very useful. This was done based on exact com-
munities, but it would naturally be more interesting to loosen the exactness
and study the case where communities are comprised of similar individuals,
up to some error, and see what this could produce in terms of the error in
the index and computation of equilibria. The work on the notion of societies
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on the first chapter and the proof of the conformity obstruction lemma could
set the pace for such an approach.
Another natural extension comes to mind: the extension of the duopoly
situation to an oligopoly. On the one hand this is a natural extension and
provides the basis for a more close connection to an econometric analysis;
on the other, this would allow to relax the imposition that consumers use
standard mixed strategies over the space of firms, and thus to relax the
hypothesis of mandatory consumption. The option of not buying would nat-
urally introduce some exogenous reservation price, and firms might, in some
situations, be led to that boundary, and get stuck in shared market situa-
tions with pure consumer strategies, which we do not have in the mandatory
consumption case. A natural departure point is the general class of deci-
sion games that we have already fully characterized and studied on the first
chapter, where we allowed for any finite set of actions. The extension to an
oligopoly situation would probably also require a new approach to creating a
one valued index, since the natural extension of the one we presented would
be an n-dimensional index.
We have focused this work on uniform pricing. This presents particular
diﬃculties as to the existence of pure price equilibria. A diﬀerent direction
would be to allow firms to use price schemes, and with the knowledge of
consumer interdependence, discriminate prices according to the influence
each consumer exerts over other consumers. Furthermore, negative prices
could also be allowed, as a form of subsidizing influential consumers, and
change loyalty characterizations. Some of the results that we have on non-
existence of equilibria for positive social propensity may be dealt with this
approach.
The work has been based on the concept of Nash equilibrium. Naturally
it would be interesting to think about other notions of equilibrium, and one
such example is (social) welfare equilibrium. Our conjecture is that allowing
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a coordination device so that consumers maximize group welfare will lead
them to fixate in pure strategies. In that sense, a natural follow-up would
be to allow firms to use price distributions and try to characterize these
price distribution in terms of the social profile. The change to a cooper-
ative setting, at least to allow some coalitions to form for some groups of
consumers, provides an approach with interesting interpretations for some
particular contexts, and the study of bounds on the price of anarchy and
price of stability would be interesting.
A generalization to consumer games with continuous space of strategies
appears also as a possible road. The duopoly results seem to hold for C1
social externality functions, as we have not used any special property of the
finite case in their proofs. Beyond generalizations, there is yet a large body
of work which is still to be done, and this includes, for example, marketing
strategies, values of a market study, loyalty characterizations, static analysis
or introducing uncertainty on the consumers or firms subgames.
In the first chapter, which was based on the characterization of the set
of pure and mixed Nash equilibiria of a decision game with three essencial
properties, a natural extension is the study of how breaking the properties
assumed for the utility function impact the results. For the duopoly this
has essencially been done. The question remains as to the Nash equilibria
set forth in the first chapter. Dyadic interactions can be relaxed to study
aggregative of forms of influence. Namely, the intertwining of the two and
the study of the relative impact of close friendship dyadic relations and gen-
eral aggregative influence seems fruitful. Breaking PBI will provoke a high
impact on the existence of pure Nash equilibria, and an interesting approach
is using it as a road to chaos. In fact, relaxing both assumptions has a
particular high impact regarding the section based on reciprocal relations.
Nevertheless, even maintaining the three essential properties, the study of
somewhat reasonable symmetry properties to impose on the social profile to
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guarantee existence of pure Nash equilibria, independent of personal space,
could be pursued in further detail, but we would recommend caution. We
have proposed some approaches, namely based on reciprocal relations and
potential games, and these aimed at finding a suﬃciency condition. A condi-
tion based on the relation of absolute values should be further investigated.
The existence of a necessary and suﬃcient condition which is relatively sim-
ple (at least simpler than what is supposed to ensure) and useful, does not
seem plausible due to the examples mentioned (see also for example [29]).
Nevertheless, there can be special cases of interest. The referendum game in
appendix already provides a tool for an experimental study of games with
and without these properties. Furthermore, it introduces the mixture when
consumers care (possibly diﬀerently) about the general outcome of the game.
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Appendix A
The referendum game.
We have built on Netlogo a game with an action set A = {Y,N,B,A} to
mean the votes yes, no, blank and abstention and that can have up to four
types of individuals. This allows the study of the classes of  4,4. We added
the possibility of breaking all properties of the utility function by adding the
following possibilities:
Quorum sensibility
ft(si) ⌘
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if si 6= A;
"o(!tN   !tY )e
 
0@ ltA/nI   0.5
&
1A2
if si = A.
Tie sensibility
gt(si) ⌘
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if si 2 {Y,N};
"o|!tN   !tY |e
 
0@ ltY   ltN
&nI
1A2
if si 2 {B,A}.
The two interior parameters "o and & reflect sensibility to outcomes and
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130 APPENDIX A. THE REFERENDUM GAME.
strateginess. The new utility function becomes
u¯(i; ) ⌘ u(i; ) + fti(si) + gti(si).
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Figure A.1: The interface for the referendum game built in Netlogo, the
part of main controls. The colors represent the players strategies: red means
voting against, green in favor, white means voting blank, and grey abstention.
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Figure A.2: The interface for the referendum game built in Netlogo, input
part.
Figure A.3: The interface for the referendum game built in Netlogo, input
part.
